vita_july_2016
vita_by _theme july 2016

ANDREW SCHOTTER

CONTACT INFORMATION
New York University
Department of Economics
19 W 4th Street, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10012
Tel: (212) 998-8952
Fax: (212) 995-3932
E-mail: andrew.schotter@nyu.edu

PERSONAL INFORMATION
Date of Birth — June 6, 1947
Married — 2 children

EDUCATION
Ph.D. Economics, New York University, 1973
M.A. Economics, New York University, 1971
B.S. Cornell University, 1969

FIELDS OF INTEREST
Teaching Experimental Economics, Economic Theory (Micro, Advanced and Intermediate), and Game Theory.
Research Applications of Game Theory to Economics Experimental Economics, Micro-Economic, and Mathematical Theories of Economic and Social Institutions.

ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE
Current Positions

  • Professor of Economics, New York University.
  • Director, Center for Experimental Social Science (C.E.S.S.), New York University.
  • Research Professor, WZB Berlin
  • Affiliated Professor, Center for Neural Science, New York University

Previous Positions

  • Chair, Department of Economics, New York University, 1988-1993, 1996- 1999.
  • Co-Director, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, 1983-1988.
  • Associate Professor, New York University, 1980-1987.
  • Assistant Professor, New York University, 1975-1979.
  • Assistant Professor, Syracuse University, 1974.
  • Associate Research Scientist, New York University, 1973-1974.

 

 

Visiting Appointments

  • Visiting Professor Columbia University, Spring 2014
  • Visiting Professor, WZB Berlin, May 2014
  • Visiting Professor, WZB Berlin, May 2013
  • Visiting Professor, Nanjing University , May, 2012
  • Visiting Professor, Laboratory of Experimental Economics, University of Prague, Summer 2011.
  • Visiting Professor, CERGE-EI, Charles University in Prague, Summer 2011.
  • Visiting Professor, University of Paris, 2009.
  • Visiting Professor, Tel Aviv University, 2006.
  • Visiting Professor, University of Amsterdam 2000-2002.
  • Visiting Scholar, Russell Sage Foundation, 1999-2000.
  • Visiting Professor, University of Venice, Spring 1993.
  • Visiting Scholar, University of Paris, January 1985.
  • Visiting Scholar, University of Wisconsin, Summer 1979.
  • Visiting Scholar, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Summer 1978.
  • Visiting Assistant Professor, Cornell University, Fall 1974.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

  • Associate Editor, Management Science, 2011-Present.
  • Associate Editor, Econometrica, 2010-Present.
  • Member, Editorial Board, Experimental Economics, 1998-Present.
  • Editorial Advisor- International Journal of Economic Science
  • Member, International Advisory Board, Journal of Research in Institutional Economics, 2011-Present.
  • Associate Editor, Games and Economic Behavior, 2003-2010.
  • Vice President, Economic Science Association, 2001-2003.
  • President, Economic Science Association, 2000-2002.
  • Member, Editorial Board, American Economics Review, 1995-2001.
  • President Elect, Economic Science Association, 1998-2000.
  • Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1990-1992.
  • Charter Member, Game Theory Society.
  • General Editor
    • Book Series, “Studies in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics,” New York University Press.
    • Book Series, “Handbooks of Economic Methodology,” Oxford University Press.
  • Coordinator
    • Economic Science Association International Meeting, New York, June 2011.
    • Economic Science Association International Meeting, New York, June 2000.
    • Conference on Applied Game Theory, Institute for Advanced Study in Vienna, Summer 1978 (with Gerhard Schwodiauer and Steven Brams).
    • International Conference on Economics and Artificial Intelligence, International Scientific Program Committee, AFCET, Paris, July 1990.
  • Consulting
    • National Broadcasting Corporation, NBC – – Sports and Decision Making
    • Credit Suisse Auctions, 2009.
    • AT&T, December 2001.
    • Deegan and Deegan – Economic Damages Case, May 1998.
    • Mulholland, Minion and Roe – Economic Damage Cases, 1993-1998.
    • Port Authority of New York – Study of Price Preference Auctions, 1995.
    • Chadbourne and Parke – Economic Damage Case, 1995.
    • Wortman, Fumuso, Kelly, DeVerna and Snyder, 1994.
    • Gardner & Nolan, Lawyers – Economic Damages Case, 1992.
    • Heidell, Pittoni, Murphy and Bach, Lawyers – Economic Damages Case, 1992.
    • Kopff, Nardelli and Dopf, Lawyers – Economic Damages Case, 1991.
    • Cole, Corret and Abrutyn, Lawyers – Securities Case, 1991.
    • United States Postal Service – Discrimination Case, 1990.
    • National Economic Research Associates (N.E.R.A.) – Experimental Study on Free-Agent System in Baseball, 1989.
    • Monroe and Lehman, Lawyers – Valuation of asset value, 1989.
    • NYU NeuroScience Center – The Economic Benefits of NeuroScience Center, 1987.
    • Pegalis and Wachsman, Lawyers – Assessment of Economic Damages, 1988.
    • American International Group – Study on the Cost of the Tort System, 1985.
    • Gulf Western Corporation – Study on Executive Compensation, 1985.
    • NYU – Columbia – Fordham University Consortium – Pricing University Courses, 1982.
    • Arnold Azarow Esq. – New York State Auto Inspection Fee Determination, 1982.
    • New York Stock Exchange – Stock Market Trading, 1974.
    • Mathematica, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey, 1972.
  • Testimony
    • Gardner & Nolan – Testimony on Damages, 1992.
    • Cole, Corret and Abrutyn – Testimony on Damages in Securities Case, 1991.
    • United States Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of New York – Testimony on Discrimination Case, 1990.
    • Kopff, Nardelli & Dopf – Testimony on Economic Damages, 1989.
    • American Arbitration Association – Testimony for Monroe and Lehman, Lawyers, 1989.
    • Pegalis and Wachsman, Lawyers – Testimony on Economic Damages, 1987-1988.
    • Conference of Insurance Legislators – Testimony on “Tort Reform and Costs,” Hershey, Pennsylvania, August 2, 1986.
    • United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee – Testimony on “Cost of the Tort System,” July 29, 1986.

 

HONORS AND AWARDS

  • Economic Theory Fellow, Society for Advancement of Economic Theory, July 2011.
  • Editor’s Award, Best Paper of the Year,  Experimental Economics,  2008.
  • Russell Sage Foundation Visiting Scholar, 1999-2000.
  • Kenan Enterprise Award, the William R. Kenan Jr. Charitable Trust, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, April 1993.

GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

  • 2017-2019 National Science Foundation, “Attention in Games and Decisions”
  • 2011-2013, National Science Foundation Grant, “School Matching, Mechanism Design, Networks and Advice:  An Experimental Study.”
  • Fullbright Grant, Prague 2011
  • 2009, Russell Sage Foundation Grant, Conference on a Methodology in Experimental Economics (with Guillaume Frechette).
  • 2007-2008, National Science Foundation Grant, “Advice Giving in Financial Markets” (with Guillaume Frechette).
  • 2007-2008, National Science Foundation Grant, Conference on Foundations of Economic Methodology.
  • 2003-2006, National Science Foundation Grant, “Decision Making with Naive Advice” (with Yaw Nyarko and Barry Sopher).
  • 2000-2001, National Science Foundation Grant, “Advice and Beliefs in Economic Decision Making” (with Yaw Nyarko and Barry Sopher).
  • 1999-2001, National Science Foundation Grant, “Belief Learning With Elcited Beliefs” (with Yaw Nyarko).
  • 1997-1999, National Science Foundation Grant, “The Evolution of Conventions of Behavior in Inter-Generational Games” (with Barry Sopher).
  • 1995-1996, William Davidson Foundation Grant, “Importing Western Style Incentive Programs into Eastern Europe.”
  • 1991-1992, Technology Transfer Fund, New York University, “Industrial Uses for Experimental Economics.”
  • 1988-1990, National Science Foundation Grant, “Bargaining under Incomplete Information” (with Roy Radner).
  • 1988-1989, National Science Foundation Grant, “An Experimental Study of Bilateral Accidents” (with L. Kornhauser).
  • 1987-1988, Industry/University Linkages Grant, New York University, “Study on Corporate Identity.”
  • 1987-1988, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, “Transfer Pricing and Bargaining with Incomplete Information” (with Roy Radner).
  • 1985-1986, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, “Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study.”
  • 1985-1986, Humanities and Social Science Council of Canada, “Sequential Auctions with Budget Constraints” (with C. Pitchik).
  • 1984-1986, Office of Naval Research, Contract No. N00014-84-K-0450, “Studies in Applied Game Theory.”
  • 1982-1983, Office of Naval Research, Contract No. N00014-78-C-0598, “Studies in Applied Game Theory.” National Science Foundation Grant (with B. Wasow and C. Pitchik).
  • 1982-1983, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, ”Internal and External Regulation of Markets with Asymmetric Information” (with C. Pitchik).
  • 1981-1982, Office of Naval Research, Contract No. N00014-8C-0598, “Studies in Applied Game Theory.”
  • 1981-1982, Netherlands Institute For Advanced Studies Fellowship
  • 1980-1981 Office of Naval Research, Contract No. N00014-78-C-0598, “Studies in Applied Game Theory.”
  • 1980-1981, Spencer Foundation Grant, “Learning Market Process” (with Roman Frydman).
  • 1979-1980, Office of Naval Research, Contract No. N00014-78-C-0598 “Studies in Applied Game Theory.”
  • 1978-1979, Office of Naval Research, Contract No. N00014-78-C-0598 “Studies in Applied Game Theory.”
  • 1976-1977, National Science Foundation Institutional Grant – Summer Research
  • 1972-1973, Dissertation Fellowship Resources for the Future, Inc.
  • 1973-1974, Research on Dissertation: Three Essays on the Allocation of Goods by Bidding and Auctioning.
  • 1970-1971, University Fellowship, New York University.
  • 1969-1970, Departmental Assistantship, Department of Economics, New York University.

GRADUATE STUDENTS RESEARCH GRANTS

  • 2016-2017 “Using the Direct Method to Test for Time Discounting Anomalies”,Tommaso Bondi
  • 2016-2017 National Science Foundation “Repated Games with Voluntary Seperation”, National Science Foundation, Doctoral Dissertation Research, Natalie Lee
  • 2016-2017 National Science Foundation “Asymmetric Auctons”, National Science Foundation, Doctoral Dissertation Research, Andrew McClellan
  • 2012-2013 National Science Foundation “Stochastic Games”, National Science Foundation, Doctoral Dissertation Research, Andrew Kloosterman
  • 2011-2012, National Science Foundation Grant, Graduate Student Anna Gumen on “Ethnic Conflict and the Provision of Public Goods:  A Framed Field Experiment” .
  • 2011-2012, National Science Foundation Grant, Graduate Student Isabel Trevino on “Costly Information Acquisition in a Speculative Attack:  Experimental Evidence” Grant: SES-1260840
  • 2010-2011, Russell Sage Foundation Grant, Graduate Student Begum Guney on “Status Quo Effects” (under my supervision).
  • 2005-2006, National Science Foundation Grant for Dissertation Improvement, Graduate Student Bei Zheng on field work in .

PUBLICATIONS

Books

Micro-Economics: A Modern Approach

  • Micro-Economics: A Modern Approach, New First Edition, Southwest Publishers, 2008.
  • Micro-Economics: A Modern Approach, Third Edition, Addison Weseley Publishers, 2000.
  • Micro-Economics: A Modern Approach, Second Edition, Addison Weseley Publishers, 1996.
  • Spanish translation, Compania EditorialContinental, S.A. de C.V., 1996.
  • French tanslation, Librarie Vuibert, 1996.
  • Italian translation, G Ciappichelli Editore srl, October 1995.
  • Micro-Economics: A Modern Approach, First Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, 1993.

Free Market Economics: A Critical Appraisal

  • Chinese translation, 2011.
  • Arabic translation, Modern Books, 1999.
  • Romanian translation, Editura Didactica Si Pedagogica, 1996.
  • Italian translation, Second Edition, Editori Riuniti, Rome, 1991.
  • Free Market Economics: A Critical Appraisal, Revised Second Edition, Basil Blackwell Publishers, 1991.
  • Spanish translation, Editorial Ariel, 1988.
  • Free Market Economics: A Critical Appraisal, First Edition, St. Martin’s Press, 1984.

The Economic Theory of Social Institutions

  • Chinese translation, 2003.
  • The Economic Theory of Social Institutions, Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Applied Game Theory, ed. Steven Brams and Gerhard Schwodiauer, Physica-Verlag, 1979.

The Selected Economic Writings of Oskar Morgenstern, New York University Press, 1977.

Book Series, “Handbooks of Economic Methodology,” Oxford University Press.

  • The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics, Volume 1, Oxford University Press, 2010 (with Andrew Caplin).
  • Methodology of Experimental Economics,  Volume 2, Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2015 (with Guillaume Frechette).

 

 

Published Papers

  1. “Complementary Institutions and Economic Development: An Experimental Study”, with Andrew Kloosterman ( Games and Economic Behavior)
  2. On Blame and Reciprocity: An Experimental Study, with Boğaçhan Çelen and Mariana Blanco, Journal of Economic Theory, 2017.
  3. “Personality, Information Acquisition and Choice under Uncertainty: An Experimental Study”, Economic Inquiry, 2017
  4. “Matching and Chatting: An Experimental Study of the Impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms” with Tingting, Games and Economic Behavior,  2016
  5. “An Experimental Study of the Impact of Competition for Other People’s Money: the Portfolio Manager Market”, (With Alberto Bison and Marina Agranov), Experimental Economics, 2014
  6. “Intrinsic and Instrumental Reciprocity: An Experimental Study”, (with Luis Cabral and Erkut Ozbay),, Games and Economic Behavior, 2014
  7. “Belief Elicitation in the Lab”, (With Isabel Trevino),, August 2014, Annual Review of Economics
  8. “Language and Government Coordination: An Experimental Study of Communication in the Announcement Game”, Journal of Public Economics, (With Marina Agranov)
  9. “On the Relationship Between Economic Theory and Experiments”, to appear in Methodology of Experimental Economics,  Volume 2, Oxford University Press, 2013, Andrew Caplin and Andrew Schotter editors.
  10. Network Architecture and Mutual Monitoring in Public Goods Experiments (with Jeffrey Carpenter and Shachar Kariv). 2012, Review of Economic Design.
  11. “Beliefs and Endogenous Cognitive Levels: An Experimental Study”, Games and Economic Behavior, 2012 (with Chloe Tergiman and Marina Agranov and Elizabeth Potamites)
  12. “Ignorance is bliss: an experimental study of the use of ambiguity and vagueness in the coordination games with asymmetric payoffs”, with Marina Agranov, 2012, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  13. “Belief Formation:  An Experiment With Outside Observers,” (with Kyle Hyndman, Erkut Ozbay, and Wolf Ehrblatt), Experimental Economics, 2012.
  14. “Convergence:  An Experimental Study of Teaching and Learning in Repeated Games,” (with Kyle Hyndman, Erkut Ozbay, and Wolf Ehrblatt), Journal of the European Economic Association, 2011.
  15. “Real-Time Search in the Laboratory and the Market,” (with Meta Brown and Christopher J. Flinn), American Economic Review, Vol. 101, No. 2,  April 2011.
  16. “An Experimental Test of Advice and Social Learning,” (with Boğaçhan Çelen and Shachar Kariv) Management Science, September 2010.
  17. “Workaholics and Drop Outs in Organizations,” (with Wieland Mueller), Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 8, No. 4, June 2010.
  18. “Paying for Confidence: An Experimental Study of the Demand for Non-Instrumental Information,” (with Kfir Eliaz), Games and Economic Behavior, 2010.
  19. “Present-Bias, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting, and Fixed Costs,” (with Jess Benhabib and Alberto Bisin),  Games and Economic Behavior, 2010.
  20. “What’s So Informative About Choice,” The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics, Handbooks of Economic Methodology, Vol. 1, (Andrew Caplin and Andrew Schotter, eds), Oxford University Press, Ch. 3, pp. 70-94, 2010.
  21. “On the Dynamics and Severity of Bank Runs: An Experimental Study,” (with Tanju Yorulmazer), Journal of Financial Intermediation Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 217-241, April 2009.
  22. “Imitation and Luck: An Experimental Study on Social Sampling,” (with Theo Offerman), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 461-502, March 2009.
  23. “Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter-Generational Minimum Effort Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice,” (with Ananish Chaudhuri and Barry Sopher), Economic Journal, Vol. 119, No. 534, pp. 91-122, January 2009.
  24. “Understanding Overbidding: Using the Neural Circuitry of Reward to Design Economic Auctions,” (with Mauricio R. Delgado, Erkut Y. Ozbay, and Elizabeth A. Phelps), Science, Vol. 321, No. 5897, pp. 1849-1852, September 2008.
  25. “Learning Under Supervision: An Experimental Study,” (with Raghuram Iyengar), Experimental Economics, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 154-173, June 2008.
  26. “Creating Competition Out of Thin Air: An Experimental Study of Right-to-Choose Auctions,” (with Kfir Eliaz and Theo Offerman), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 62, No. 2, pp. 383-416, March 2008.
  27. “Experimental Testing of Intrinsic Preferences for NonInstrumental Information,” (with Kfir Eliaz), American Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 2, pp. 166-169, May 2007.
  28. “Advice and Behavior in Intergenerational Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Approach,” (with Barry Sopher), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 365-393, February 2007.
  29. “Strong and Wrong: The Use of Rational Choice Theory in Experimental Economics,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 498-511, October 2006.
  30. “On the Informational Content of Advice: A Theoretical and Experimental Study,” (with Yaw Nyarko and Barry Sopher), Economic Theory, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 433-452, October 2006.
  31. “Trust and Trustworthiness in Games: An Experimental Study of Intergenerational Advice,” (with Barry Sopher), Experimental Economics, Vol. 9, No.2, pp. 123-145, June 2006.
  32. “Conventional Behavior,” Social Psychology and Economics, (David De Cremer, Marcel Zeelenberg, and J. Keith Murnighan, eds.), Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, London, Ch. 3, pp. 31-54, 2006.
  33. “Decision Making With Naïve Advice,” Experimental Business Research, Vol. II: Economic and Managerial Perspectives, (Amnon Rapoport and Rami Zwick, eds.), Springer Dordrecht, New York, Ch. 12, pp. 223-248, 2005.
  34. “Multiperson Tournaments: An Experimental Examination,” (with Alannah Orrison and Keith Weigelt), Management Science, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 268-279, February 2004.
  35. “Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Intergenerational Games: An Experimental Study,” (with Barry Sopher), Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 111, No. 3, pp. 498-529, June 2003.
  36. “Decision Making with Naive Advice,” American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 2, pp. 196-201, May 2003.
  37. “Learning By Not Doing: An Experimental Investigation of Observational Learning,” (with Antonio Merlo), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 116-136, January 2003.
  38. “An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs,” (with Yaw Nyarko), Econometrica, Vol. 70, No. 3, pp. 971-1005, May 2002.
  39. “Bargaining Through Agents: An Experimental Study of Delegation and Commitment,” (with Wei Zheng and Blaine Snyder),Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 248-292, February 2000.
  40. “A Surprise-Quiz View of Learning in Economic Experiments,” (with Antonio Merlo), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 25-54, July 1999.
  41. “Can Affirmative Action be Cost Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions,” (with Allan Corns), American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 1, pp. 291-305, March 1999.
  42. “A Practical Person’s Guide to Mechanism Selection: Some Lessons from Experimental Economics,” Organization With Incomplete Information (Mukul Majumdar, ed.), Cambridge University Press, Ch. 6, pp. 208-238, 1998.
  43. “Productivity Under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study,” (with Haig R. Nalbantian), American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No.3, pp. 314-341, June 1997.
  44. “Fairness and Survival in Ultimatum and Dictatorship Games,” (with Avi Weiss and Inigo Zapater), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 37-56, October 1996.
  45. “You’re Not Making Sense, You’re Just Being Logical’: Some Thoughts on Doing Economics,” Foundations of Research in Economics, (Steven G. Medema and Warren J. Samuels, eds.), Edward Elgar Publishers, 1996.
  46. “Matching and Efficiency in the Baseball Free-Agent System: An Experimental Examination,” (with Haig R. Nalbantian), Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 1-31, January 1995.
  47. “Norms and Competition in Markets with Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Study of the Development of Industry Ethics,” (with Carolyn Pitchik), Metroeconomica, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 188-207, June 1994.
  48. “A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects,” (with Keith Weigelt and Charles Wilson), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 445-468, May 1994.
  49. “Information Transmission in Regulated Markets,” (with Carolyn Pitchik), Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 815-829, November 1993.
  50. “Do People Treat Games Like Games? An Overview of Some Experimental Results,” (with Antonio M. Merlo), Cuadernos Economicos de ICE, Vol. 54, pp. 197-210, 1993.
  51. “Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: Comment,” (with Antonio Merlo), American Economic Review, Vol. 82, No.5, pp. 1413-1425, December 1992.
  52. “Behavioral Consequences of Corporate Incentives and Long-Term Bonuses: An Experimental Study,” (with Keith Weigelt), Management Science, Vol. 38, No. 9, pp. 1280-1298, September 1992.
  53. “Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal Opportunity Laws, and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results,” (with Keith Weigelt), Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, No. 2, pp. 511-539, May 1992.
  54. “Oskar Morgenstern’s Contribution to the Development of the Theory of Games,” History of Political Economy, Vol. 24 (Supplement), pp. 95-112, 1992.
  55. “Beyond Optimizing,” (by Michael Slote), book review in Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 128-132, April 1991.
  56. “A Game Theory Analysis of Dual Discrimination,” (with Janet Dukerich and Keith Weigelt), Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 21-41, October 1990.
  57. “Bad and Good News About the Sealed-Bid Mechanism: Some Experimental Results,” American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 2, pp. 220-226, May 1990.
  58. “An Experimental Study of Single-Actor Accidents,” (with Lewis Kornhauser), Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 203-233, January 1990.
  59. “Reactions to Discrimination in an Incentive Pay Compensation Scheme: A Game-Theoretic Approach,” (with Keith Weigelt and Janet Dukerich),Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 26-44, August 1989.
  60. “The Sealed-Bid Mechanism: An Experimental Study,” (with Roy Radner), Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 179-220, June 1989.
  61. “Perfect Equilibria in Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study,” (with Carolyn Pitchik), RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 363-388, Autumn 1988.
  62. “The Benefits of Equal Opportunity: Equity vs. Efficiency,” (with Keith Weigelt), Business and Society Review, No. 65, pp. 45-47, Spring 1988.
  63. “Comments on Markets and Institution,” Economic Institutions in a Dynamic Society, (Takashi Shiraishi, ed.), 1988.
  64. “Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information Transmission,” (with Carolyn Pitchik), American Economic Review, Vol. 77, No. 5,  pp. 1032-1036, December 1987.
  65. “Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study,” (with Clive Bull and Keith Weigelt), Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 95, No. 1, pp. 1-33, February 1987.
  66. “On the Economic Virtues of Incompetency and Dishonesty,” Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior, (Andreas Diekmann and Peter Mitter, eds.), Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg, pp. 235-241, 1986.
  67. “The Evolution of Rules,” Economics as a Process, (Richard N. Langlois, ed.), Cambridge University Press, Ch. 5, pp. 117-134, 1986.
  68. “Game Theory in the Social Sciences: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Political Economy,” (by Martin Shubik), book review in Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 1783-1785, December 1985.
  69. “Reason in Human Affairs,” (by Herbert A. Simon), book review in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 387-390, December 1985.
  70. “The Garbage Game, Inflation, and Incomes Policies,” (with Clive Bull), Macroeconomic Conflict and Social Institutions, (Shlomo Maital and Irwin Lipnowski, eds.), Ballinger Publishing Co., Ch. 4, pp. 121-140, 1985.
  71. “An Essay on Oskar Morgenstern,” Contemporary Economists in Perspective, (Warren Samuels. ed.), JAI Press, 1984.
  72. “Measurement in Public Choice,” (by Steinar Strom), book review in Economic Journal, Vol.93, No. 370, pp. 447-448, June 1983.
  73. “Selfishness, Altruism and Rationality: A Theory of Social Choice,” (by Howard Margolis), book review in Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 555-557, June 1983.
  74. Why Take a Game Theoretical Approach to Economics? Institutions, Economics and Game Theory,” Economie Applique, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 673-695, 1983.
  75. “Rational Expectations of Government Policy: An Application of Newcomb’s Problem,” (with Roman Frydman and Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr.), Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 311-319, October 1982.
  76. “Labor Market Search: An Experimental Study,” (with Yale M. Braunstein), Economic Inquiry, Vol. 20, No. 1, January 1982, pp. 133-144.
  77. “The Paradox of Redistribution: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results,” Power, Voting, and Voting Power, (Manfred J. Holler, ed.), Physica-Verlag, Vienna, 1982.
  78. “When is the Incentive Problem Real?” (with Simeon M. Berman), Games Economic Dynamics and Time Series Analysis, (M. Deiotter, E. Furst and G. Schwodiauer, eds.) Physica Verlag, Vienna, 1982.
  79. “On the Political Sustainability of Taxes,” (with Janusz A. Ordover), American Economic Review, Vol. 71, No. 2, pp. 278-282, May 1981.
  80. “Economic Search: An Experimental Study,” (with Yale M. Braunstein), Economic Inquiry, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 1-25, January 1981.
  81. “Economics and the Theory of Games: A Survey,” (with Gerhard Schwodiauer), Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 479-527, June 1980.
  82. “Power Relationships in the International Monetary Fund: The Consequences of Quota Changes,” (with Jacob S. Dreyer), The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 62, No. 1, pp. 97-106, February 1980.
  83. “General X-Efficiency Theory and Economic Development,” (by Harvey Leibenstein), book review in Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 1475-1476, December 1979.
  84. “Disadvantageous Syndicates in Public Goods Economies,” American Economic Review, Vol. 69, No. 5, pp. 927-933, December 1979.
  85. “Voting Weights or Power Proxies: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results,” Applied Game Theory, (Steven J. Brams, Andrew Schotter, and Gerhard Schwodiauer, eds.), Physica-Verlag, pp. 57-73, 1979.
  86. “The Effects of Precedent on Arbitration,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 659-677, December 1978.
  87. “The Inevitability of the ‘Paradox of Redistribution’ in the Allocation of Voting Weights,” (with Dietrich Fischer), Public Choice, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 49-67, February 1978.
  88. “An Experimental Study of the Problem of ‘Theory Absorption’ in N-Person Bargaining Situations or Games,” (with Yale Braunstein), Coalition Forming Behavior, (Heinz Sauermann, ed.), pp. 1-25, 1978.
  89. “On Urban Residential Stability and the Core,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 321-337, November 1977.
  90. “Economically Efficient and Politically Sustainable Economic Contractions,”Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, (Rudolph Henn and Otto Moeschlin, eds.), Berlin, pp. 400-418, 1977.
  91. “Merger Illusions and Externalities,” (with Janusz A. Ordover), Eastern Economic Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 19-21, January 1976.
  92. “Auctions and Economic Theory,” Bidding and Auctioning for Procurement and Allocation, (Yakov Amihud, ed), New York University Press, pp. 3-13, 1976.
  93. “Auctioning Bohm-Bawerk’s Horses,” International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 195-215, December 1974.
  94. “Core Allocations and Competitive Equilibrium–A Survey,” Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, Vol. 33, No. 3-4, pp. 281-313, September 1973.

 

ANDREW SCHOTTER

CONTACT INFORMATION
New York University
Department of Economics
19 W 4th Street, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10012
Tel: (212) 998-8952
Fax: (212) 995-3932
E-mail: andrew.schotter@nyu.edu

PERSONAL INFORMATION
Date of Birth — June 6, 1947
Married — 2 children

EDUCATION
Ph.D. Economics, New York University, 1973
M.A. Economics, New York University, 1971
B.S. Cornell University, 1969

FIELDS OF INTEREST
Teaching Experimental Economics, Economic Theory (Micro, Advanced and Intermediate), and Game Theory.
Research Applications of Game Theory to Economics Experimental Economics, Micro-Economic, and Mathematical Theories of Economic and Social Institutions.

ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE
Current Positions

  • Professor of Economics, New York University.
  • Director, Center for Experimental Social Science (C.E.S.S.), New York University.
  • Research Professor, WZB Berlin
  • Affiliated Professor, Center for Neural Science, New York University

Previous Positions

  • Chair, Department of Economics, New York University, 1988-1993, 1996- 1999.
  • Co-Director, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, 1983-1988.
  • Associate Professor, New York University, 1980-1987.
  • Assistant Professor, New York University, 1975-1979.
  • Assistant Professor, Syracuse University, 1974.
  • Associate Research Scientist, New York University, 1973-1974.

 

 

Visiting Appointments

  • Visiting Professor Columbia University, Spring 2014
  • Visiting Professor, WZB Berlin, May 2014
  • Visiting Professor, WZB Berlin, May 2013
  • Visiting Professor, Nanjing University , May, 2012
  • Visiting Professor, Laboratory of Experimental Economics, University of Prague, Summer 2011.
  • Visiting Professor, CERGE-EI, Charles University in Prague, Summer 2011.
  • Visiting Professor, University of Paris, 2009.
  • Visiting Professor, Tel Aviv University, 2006.
  • Visiting Professor, University of Amsterdam 2000-2002.
  • Visiting Scholar, Russell Sage Foundation, 1999-2000.
  • Visiting Professor, University of Venice, Spring 1993.
  • Visiting Scholar, University of Paris, January 1985.
  • Visiting Scholar, University of Wisconsin, Summer 1979.
  • Visiting Scholar, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Summer 1978.
  • Visiting Assistant Professor, Cornell University, Fall 1974.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

  • Associate Editor, Management Science, 2011-Present.
  • Associate Editor, Econometrica, 2010-Present.
  • Member, Editorial Board, Experimental Economics, 1998-Present.
  • Editorial Advisor- International Journal of Economic Science
  • Member, International Advisory Board, Journal of Research in Institutional Economics, 2011-Present.
  • Associate Editor, Games and Economic Behavior, 2003-2010.
  • Vice President, Economic Science Association, 2001-2003.
  • President, Economic Science Association, 2000-2002.
  • Member, Editorial Board, American Economics Review, 1995-2001.
  • President Elect, Economic Science Association, 1998-2000.
  • Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1990-1992.
  • Charter Member, Game Theory Society.
  • General Editor
    • Book Series, “Studies in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics,” New York University Press.
    • Book Series, “Handbooks of Economic Methodology,” Oxford University Press.
  • Coordinator
    • Economic Science Association International Meeting, New York, June 2011.
    • Economic Science Association International Meeting, New York, June 2000.
    • Conference on Applied Game Theory, Institute for Advanced Study in Vienna, Summer 1978 (with Gerhard Schwodiauer and Steven Brams).
    • International Conference on Economics and Artificial Intelligence, International Scientific Program Committee, AFCET, Paris, July 1990.
  • Consulting
    • National Broadcasting Corporation, NBC – – Sports and Decision Making
    • Credit Suisse Auctions, 2009.
    • AT&T, December 2001.
    • Deegan and Deegan – Economic Damages Case, May 1998.
    • Mulholland, Minion and Roe – Economic Damage Cases, 1993-1998.
    • Port Authority of New York – Study of Price Preference Auctions, 1995.
    • Chadbourne and Parke – Economic Damage Case, 1995.
    • Wortman, Fumuso, Kelly, DeVerna and Snyder, 1994.
    • Gardner & Nolan, Lawyers – Economic Damages Case, 1992.
    • Heidell, Pittoni, Murphy and Bach, Lawyers – Economic Damages Case, 1992.
    • Kopff, Nardelli and Dopf, Lawyers – Economic Damages Case, 1991.
    • Cole, Corret and Abrutyn, Lawyers – Securities Case, 1991.
    • United States Postal Service – Discrimination Case, 1990.
    • National Economic Research Associates (N.E.R.A.) – Experimental Study on Free-Agent System in Baseball, 1989.
    • Monroe and Lehman, Lawyers – Valuation of asset value, 1989.
    • NYU NeuroScience Center – The Economic Benefits of NeuroScience Center, 1987.
    • Pegalis and Wachsman, Lawyers – Assessment of Economic Damages, 1988.
    • American International Group – Study on the Cost of the Tort System, 1985.
    • Gulf Western Corporation – Study on Executive Compensation, 1985.
    • NYU – Columbia – Fordham University Consortium – Pricing University Courses, 1982.
    • Arnold Azarow Esq. – New York State Auto Inspection Fee Determination, 1982.
    • New York Stock Exchange – Stock Market Trading, 1974.
    • Mathematica, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey, 1972.
  • Testimony
    • Gardner & Nolan – Testimony on Damages, 1992.
    • Cole, Corret and Abrutyn – Testimony on Damages in Securities Case, 1991.
    • United States Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of New York – Testimony on Discrimination Case, 1990.
    • Kopff, Nardelli & Dopf – Testimony on Economic Damages, 1989.
    • American Arbitration Association – Testimony for Monroe and Lehman, Lawyers, 1989.
    • Pegalis and Wachsman, Lawyers – Testimony on Economic Damages, 1987-1988.
    • Conference of Insurance Legislators – Testimony on “Tort Reform and Costs,” Hershey, Pennsylvania, August 2, 1986.
    • United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee – Testimony on “Cost of the Tort System,” July 29, 1986.

 

HONORS AND AWARDS

  • Economic Theory Fellow, Society for Advancement of Economic Theory, July 2011.
  • Editor’s Award, Best Paper of the Year,  Experimental Economics,  2008.
  • Russell Sage Foundation Visiting Scholar, 1999-2000.
  • Kenan Enterprise Award, the William R. Kenan Jr. Charitable Trust, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, April 1993.

GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

  • 2011-2013, National Science Foundation Grant, “School Matching, Mechanism Design, Networks and Advice:  An Experimental Study.”
  • Fullbright Grant, Prague 2011
  • 2009, Russell Sage Foundation Grant, Conference on a Methodology in Experimental Economics (with Guillaume Frechette).
  • 2007-2008, National Science Foundation Grant, “Advice Giving in Financial Markets” (with Guillaume Frechette).
  • 2007-2008, National Science Foundation Grant, Conference on Foundations of Economic Methodology.
  • 2003-2006, National Science Foundation Grant, “Decision Making with Naive Advice” (with Yaw Nyarko and Barry Sopher).
  • 2000-2001, National Science Foundation Grant, “Advice and Beliefs in Economic Decision Making” (with Yaw Nyarko and Barry Sopher).
  • 1999-2001, National Science Foundation Grant, “Belief Learning With Elcited Beliefs” (with Yaw Nyarko).
  • 1997-1999, National Science Foundation Grant, “The Evolution of Conventions of Behavior in Inter-Generational Games” (with Barry Sopher).
  • 1995-1996, William Davidson Foundation Grant, “Importing Western Style Incentive Programs into Eastern Europe.”
  • 1991-1992, Technology Transfer Fund, New York University, “Industrial Uses for Experimental Economics.”
  • 1988-1990, National Science Foundation Grant, “Bargaining under Incomplete Information” (with Roy Radner).
  • 1988-1989, National Science Foundation Grant, “An Experimental Study of Bilateral Accidents” (with L. Kornhauser).
  • 1987-1988, Industry/University Linkages Grant, New York University, “Study on Corporate Identity.”
  • 1987-1988, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, “Transfer Pricing and Bargaining with Incomplete Information” (with Roy Radner).
  • 1985-1986, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, “Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study.”
  • 1985-1986, Humanities and Social Science Council of Canada, “Sequential Auctions with Budget Constraints” (with C. Pitchik).
  • 1984-1986, Office of Naval Research, Contract No. N00014-84-K-0450, “Studies in Applied Game Theory.”
  • 1982-1983, Office of Naval Research, Contract No. N00014-78-C-0598, “Studies in Applied Game Theory.” National Science Foundation Grant (with B. Wasow and C. Pitchik).
  • 1982-1983, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, ”Internal and External Regulation of Markets with Asymmetric Information” (with C. Pitchik).
  • 1981-1982, Office of Naval Research, Contract No. N00014-8C-0598, “Studies in Applied Game Theory.”
  • 1981-1982, Netherlands Institute For Advanced Studies Fellowship
  • 1980-1981 Office of Naval Research, Contract No. N00014-78-C-0598, “Studies in Applied Game Theory.”
  • 1980-1981, Spencer Foundation Grant, “Learning Market Process” (with Roman Frydman).
  • 1979-1980, Office of Naval Research, Contract No. N00014-78-C-0598 “Studies in Applied Game Theory.”
  • 1978-1979, Office of Naval Research, Contract No. N00014-78-C-0598 “Studies in Applied Game Theory.”
  • 1976-1977, National Science Foundation Institutional Grant – Summer Research
  • 1972-1973, Dissertation Fellowship Resources for the Future, Inc.
  • 1973-1974, Research on Dissertation: Three Essays on the Allocation of Goods by Bidding and Auctioning.
  • 1970-1971, University Fellowship, New York University.
  • 1969-1970, Departmental Assistantship, Department of Economics, New York University.

GRADUATE STUDENTS RESEARCH GRANTS

  • 2016-2017 National Science Foundation “Repated Games with Voluntary Seperation”, National Science Foundation, Doctoral Dissertation Research, Natalie Lee
  • 2016-2017 National Science Foundation “Asymmetric Auctons”, National Science Foundation, Doctoral Dissertation Research, Andrew McClellan
  • 2012-2013 National Science Foundation “Stochastic Games”, National Science Foundation, Doctoral Dissertation Research, Andrew Kloosterman
  • 2011-2012, National Science Foundation Grant, Graduate Student Anna Gumen on “Ethnic Conflict and the Provision of Public Goods:  A Framed Field Experiment” .
  • 2011-2012, National Science Foundation Grant, Graduate Student Isabel Trevino on “Costly Information Acquisition in a Speculative Attack:  Experimental Evidence” Grant: SES-1260840
  • 2010-2011, Russell Sage Foundation Grant, Graduate Student Begum Guney on “Status Quo Effects” (under my supervision).
  • 2005-2006, National Science Foundation Grant for Dissertation Improvement, Graduate Student Bei Zheng on field work in .

PUBLICATIONS

Books

Micro-Economics: A Modern Approach

  • Micro-Economics: A Modern Approach, New First Edition, Southwest Publishers, 2008.
  • Micro-Economics: A Modern Approach, Third Edition, Addison Weseley Publishers, 2000.
  • Micro-Economics: A Modern Approach, Second Edition, Addison Weseley Publishers, 1996.
  • Spanish translation, Compania EditorialContinental, S.A. de C.V., 1996.
  • French tanslation, Librarie Vuibert, 1996.
  • Italian translation, G Ciappichelli Editore srl, October 1995.
  • Micro-Economics: A Modern Approach, First Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, 1993.

Free Market Economics: A Critical Appraisal

  • Chinese translation, 2011.
  • Arabic translation, Modern Books, 1999.
  • Romanian translation, Editura Didactica Si Pedagogica, 1996.
  • Italian translation, Second Edition, Editori Riuniti, Rome, 1991.
  • Free Market Economics: A Critical Appraisal, Revised Second Edition, Basil Blackwell Publishers, 1991.
  • Spanish translation, Editorial Ariel, 1988.
  • Free Market Economics: A Critical Appraisal, First Edition, St. Martin’s Press, 1984.

The Economic Theory of Social Institutions

  • Chinese translation, 2003.
  • The Economic Theory of Social Institutions, Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Applied Game Theory, ed. Steven Brams and Gerhard Schwodiauer, Physica-Verlag, 1979.

The Selected Economic Writings of Oskar Morgenstern, New York University Press, 1977.

Book Series, “Handbooks of Economic Methodology,” Oxford University Press.

  • The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics, Volume 1, Oxford University Press, 2010 (with Andrew Caplin).
  • Methodology of Experimental Economics,  Volume 2, Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2015 (with Guillaume Frechette).

 

 

Published Papers

  1. “Complementary Institutions and Economic Development: An Experimental Study”, with Andrew Kloosterman (Forthcoming Games and Economic Behavior)
  2. On Blame and Reciprocity: An Experimental Study, with Boğaçhan Çelen and Mariana Blanco, Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming 2017.
  3. “Matching and Chatting: An Experimental Study of the Impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms” with Tingting, Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming 2016
  4. “An Experimental Study of the Impact of Competition for Other People’s Money: the Portfolio Manager Market”, (With Alberto Bison and Marina Agranov), forthcoming Experimental Economics, 2014
  5. “Intrinsic and Instrumental Reciprocity: An Experimental Study”, (with Luis Cabral and Erkut Ozbay), forthcoming, Games and Economic Behavior, 2014
  6. “Belief Elicitation in the Lab”, (With Isabel Trevino), forthcoming, August 2014, Annual Review of Economics
  7. “Language and Government Coordination: An Experimental Study of Communication in the Announcement Game”, Forthcoming, Journal of Public Economics, (With Marina Agranov)
  8. “On the Relationship Between Economic Theory and Experiments”, to appear in Methodology of Experimental Economics,  Volume 2, Oxford University Press, 2013, Andrew Caplin and Andrew Schotter editors.
  9. Network Architecture and Mutual Monitoring in Public Goods Experiments (with Jeffrey Carpenter and Shachar Kariv). 2012, Review of Economic Design.
  10. “Beliefs and Endogenous Cognitive Levels: An Experimental Study”, Games and Economic Behavior, 2012 (with Chloe Tergiman and Marina Agranov and Elizabeth Potamites)
  11. “Ignorance is bliss: an experimental study of the use of ambiguity and vagueness in the coordination games with asymmetric payoffs”, with Marina Agranov, 2012, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  12. “Belief Formation:  An Experiment With Outside Observers,” (with Kyle Hyndman, Erkut Ozbay, and Wolf Ehrblatt), Experimental Economics, 2012.
  13. “Convergence:  An Experimental Study of Teaching and Learning in Repeated Games,” (with Kyle Hyndman, Erkut Ozbay, and Wolf Ehrblatt), Journal of the European Economic Association, 2011.
  14. “Real-Time Search in the Laboratory and the Market,” (with Meta Brown and Christopher J. Flinn), American Economic Review, Vol. 101, No. 2,  April 2011.
  15. “An Experimental Test of Advice and Social Learning,” (with Boğaçhan Çelen and Shachar Kariv) Management Science, September 2010.
  16. “Workaholics and Drop Outs in Organizations,” (with Wieland Mueller), Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 8, No. 4, June 2010.
  17. “Paying for Confidence: An Experimental Study of the Demand for Non-Instrumental Information,” (with Kfir Eliaz), Games and Economic Behavior, 2010.
  18. “Present-Bias, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting, and Fixed Costs,” (with Jess Benhabib and Alberto Bisin),  Games and Economic Behavior, 2010.
  19. “What’s So Informative About Choice,” The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics, Handbooks of Economic Methodology, Vol. 1, (Andrew Caplin and Andrew Schotter, eds), Oxford University Press, Ch. 3, pp. 70-94, 2010.
  20. “On the Dynamics and Severity of Bank Runs: An Experimental Study,” (with Tanju Yorulmazer), Journal of Financial Intermediation Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 217-241, April 2009.
  21. “Imitation and Luck: An Experimental Study on Social Sampling,” (with Theo Offerman), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 461-502, March 2009.
  22. “Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter-Generational Minimum Effort Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice,” (with Ananish Chaudhuri and Barry Sopher), Economic Journal, Vol. 119, No. 534, pp. 91-122, January 2009.
  23. “Understanding Overbidding: Using the Neural Circuitry of Reward to Design Economic Auctions,” (with Mauricio R. Delgado, Erkut Y. Ozbay, and Elizabeth A. Phelps), Science, Vol. 321, No. 5897, pp. 1849-1852, September 2008.
  24. “Learning Under Supervision: An Experimental Study,” (with Raghuram Iyengar), Experimental Economics, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 154-173, June 2008.
  25. “Creating Competition Out of Thin Air: An Experimental Study of Right-to-Choose Auctions,” (with Kfir Eliaz and Theo Offerman), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 62, No. 2, pp. 383-416, March 2008.
  26. “Experimental Testing of Intrinsic Preferences for NonInstrumental Information,” (with Kfir Eliaz), American Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 2, pp. 166-169, May 2007.
  27. “Advice and Behavior in Intergenerational Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Approach,” (with Barry Sopher), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 365-393, February 2007.
  28. “Strong and Wrong: The Use of Rational Choice Theory in Experimental Economics,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 498-511, October 2006.
  29. “On the Informational Content of Advice: A Theoretical and Experimental Study,” (with Yaw Nyarko and Barry Sopher), Economic Theory, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 433-452, October 2006.
  30. “Trust and Trustworthiness in Games: An Experimental Study of Intergenerational Advice,” (with Barry Sopher), Experimental Economics, Vol. 9, No.2, pp. 123-145, June 2006.
  31. “Conventional Behavior,” Social Psychology and Economics, (David De Cremer, Marcel Zeelenberg, and J. Keith Murnighan, eds.), Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, London, Ch. 3, pp. 31-54, 2006.
  32. “Decision Making With Naïve Advice,” Experimental Business Research, Vol. II: Economic and Managerial Perspectives, (Amnon Rapoport and Rami Zwick, eds.), Springer Dordrecht, New York, Ch. 12, pp. 223-248, 2005.
  33. “Multiperson Tournaments: An Experimental Examination,” (with Alannah Orrison and Keith Weigelt), Management Science, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 268-279, February 2004.
  34. “Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Intergenerational Games: An Experimental Study,” (with Barry Sopher), Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 111, No. 3, pp. 498-529, June 2003.
  35. “Decision Making with Naive Advice,” American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 2, pp. 196-201, May 2003.
  36. “Learning By Not Doing: An Experimental Investigation of Observational Learning,” (with Antonio Merlo), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 116-136, January 2003.
  37. “An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs,” (with Yaw Nyarko), Econometrica, Vol. 70, No. 3, pp. 971-1005, May 2002.
  38. “Bargaining Through Agents: An Experimental Study of Delegation and Commitment,” (with Wei Zheng and Blaine Snyder),Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 248-292, February 2000.
  39. “A Surprise-Quiz View of Learning in Economic Experiments,” (with Antonio Merlo), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 25-54, July 1999.
  40. “Can Affirmative Action be Cost Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions,” (with Allan Corns), American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 1, pp. 291-305, March 1999.
  41. “A Practical Person’s Guide to Mechanism Selection: Some Lessons from Experimental Economics,” Organization With Incomplete Information (Mukul Majumdar, ed.), Cambridge University Press, Ch. 6, pp. 208-238, 1998.
  42. “Productivity Under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study,” (with Haig R. Nalbantian), American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No.3, pp. 314-341, June 1997.
  43. “Fairness and Survival in Ultimatum and Dictatorship Games,” (with Avi Weiss and Inigo Zapater), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 37-56, October 1996.
  44. “You’re Not Making Sense, You’re Just Being Logical’: Some Thoughts on Doing Economics,” Foundations of Research in Economics, (Steven G. Medema and Warren J. Samuels, eds.), Edward Elgar Publishers, 1996.
  45. “Matching and Efficiency in the Baseball Free-Agent System: An Experimental Examination,” (with Haig R. Nalbantian), Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 1-31, January 1995.
  46. “Norms and Competition in Markets with Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Study of the Development of Industry Ethics,” (with Carolyn Pitchik), Metroeconomica, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 188-207, June 1994.
  47. “A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects,” (with Keith Weigelt and Charles Wilson), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 445-468, May 1994.
  48. “Information Transmission in Regulated Markets,” (with Carolyn Pitchik), Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 815-829, November 1993.
  49. “Do People Treat Games Like Games? An Overview of Some Experimental Results,” (with Antonio M. Merlo), Cuadernos Economicos de ICE, Vol. 54, pp. 197-210, 1993.
  50. “Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: Comment,” (with Antonio Merlo), American Economic Review, Vol. 82, No.5, pp. 1413-1425, December 1992.
  51. “Behavioral Consequences of Corporate Incentives and Long-Term Bonuses: An Experimental Study,” (with Keith Weigelt), Management Science, Vol. 38, No. 9, pp. 1280-1298, September 1992.
  52. “Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal Opportunity Laws, and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results,” (with Keith Weigelt), Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, No. 2, pp. 511-539, May 1992.
  53. “Oskar Morgenstern’s Contribution to the Development of the Theory of Games,” History of Political Economy, Vol. 24 (Supplement), pp. 95-112, 1992.
  54. “Beyond Optimizing,” (by Michael Slote), book review in Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 128-132, April 1991.
  55. “A Game Theory Analysis of Dual Discrimination,” (with Janet Dukerich and Keith Weigelt), Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 21-41, October 1990.
  56. “Bad and Good News About the Sealed-Bid Mechanism: Some Experimental Results,” American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 2, pp. 220-226, May 1990.
  57. “An Experimental Study of Single-Actor Accidents,” (with Lewis Kornhauser), Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 203-233, January 1990.
  58. “Reactions to Discrimination in an Incentive Pay Compensation Scheme: A Game-Theoretic Approach,” (with Keith Weigelt and Janet Dukerich),Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 26-44, August 1989.
  59. “The Sealed-Bid Mechanism: An Experimental Study,” (with Roy Radner), Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 179-220, June 1989.
  60. “Perfect Equilibria in Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study,” (with Carolyn Pitchik), RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 363-388, Autumn 1988.
  61. “The Benefits of Equal Opportunity: Equity vs. Efficiency,” (with Keith Weigelt), Business and Society Review, No. 65, pp. 45-47, Spring 1988.
  62. “Comments on Markets and Institution,” Economic Institutions in a Dynamic Society, (Takashi Shiraishi, ed.), 1988.
  63. “Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information Transmission,” (with Carolyn Pitchik), American Economic Review, Vol. 77, No. 5,  pp. 1032-1036, December 1987.
  64. “Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study,” (with Clive Bull and Keith Weigelt), Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 95, No. 1, pp. 1-33, February 1987.
  65. “On the Economic Virtues of Incompetency and Dishonesty,” Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior, (Andreas Diekmann and Peter Mitter, eds.), Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg, pp. 235-241, 1986.
  66. “The Evolution of Rules,” Economics as a Process, (Richard N. Langlois, ed.), Cambridge University Press, Ch. 5, pp. 117-134, 1986.
  67. “Game Theory in the Social Sciences: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Political Economy,” (by Martin Shubik), book review in Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 1783-1785, December 1985.
  68. “Reason in Human Affairs,” (by Herbert A. Simon), book review in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 387-390, December 1985.
  69. “The Garbage Game, Inflation, and Incomes Policies,” (with Clive Bull), Macroeconomic Conflict and Social Institutions, (Shlomo Maital and Irwin Lipnowski, eds.), Ballinger Publishing Co., Ch. 4, pp. 121-140, 1985.
  70. “An Essay on Oskar Morgenstern,” Contemporary Economists in Perspective, (Warren Samuels. ed.), JAI Press, 1984.
  71. “Measurement in Public Choice,” (by Steinar Strom), book review in Economic Journal, Vol.93, No. 370, pp. 447-448, June 1983.
  72. “Selfishness, Altruism and Rationality: A Theory of Social Choice,” (by Howard Margolis), book review in Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 555-557, June 1983.
  73. Why Take a Game Theoretical Approach to Economics? Institutions, Economics and Game Theory,” Economie Applique, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 673-695, 1983.
  74. “Rational Expectations of Government Policy: An Application of Newcomb’s Problem,” (with Roman Frydman and Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr.), Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 311-319, October 1982.
  75. “Labor Market Search: An Experimental Study,” (with Yale M. Braunstein), Economic Inquiry, Vol. 20, No. 1, January 1982, pp. 133-144.
  76. “The Paradox of Redistribution: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results,” Power, Voting, and Voting Power, (Manfred J. Holler, ed.), Physica-Verlag, Vienna, 1982.
  77. “When is the Incentive Problem Real?” (with Simeon M. Berman), Games Economic Dynamics and Time Series Analysis, (M. Deiotter, E. Furst and G. Schwodiauer, eds.) Physica Verlag, Vienna, 1982.
  78. “On the Political Sustainability of Taxes,” (with Janusz A. Ordover), American Economic Review, Vol. 71, No. 2, pp. 278-282, May 1981.
  79. “Economic Search: An Experimental Study,” (with Yale M. Braunstein), Economic Inquiry, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 1-25, January 1981.
  80. “Economics and the Theory of Games: A Survey,” (with Gerhard Schwodiauer), Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 479-527, June 1980.
  81. “Power Relationships in the International Monetary Fund: The Consequences of Quota Changes,” (with Jacob S. Dreyer), The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 62, No. 1, pp. 97-106, February 1980.
  82. “General X-Efficiency Theory and Economic Development,” (by Harvey Leibenstein), book review in Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 1475-1476, December 1979.
  83. “Disadvantageous Syndicates in Public Goods Economies,” American Economic Review, Vol. 69, No. 5, pp. 927-933, December 1979.
  84. “Voting Weights or Power Proxies: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results,” Applied Game Theory, (Steven J. Brams, Andrew Schotter, and Gerhard Schwodiauer, eds.), Physica-Verlag, pp. 57-73, 1979.
  85. “The Effects of Precedent on Arbitration,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 659-677, December 1978.
  86. “The Inevitability of the ‘Paradox of Redistribution’ in the Allocation of Voting Weights,” (with Dietrich Fischer), Public Choice, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 49-67, February 1978.
  87. “An Experimental Study of the Problem of ‘Theory Absorption’ in N-Person Bargaining Situations or Games,” (with Yale Braunstein), Coalition Forming Behavior, (Heinz Sauermann, ed.), pp. 1-25, 1978.
  88. “On Urban Residential Stability and the Core,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 321-337, November 1977.
  89. “Economically Efficient and Politically Sustainable Economic Contractions,”Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, (Rudolph Henn and Otto Moeschlin, eds.), Berlin, pp. 400-418, 1977.
  90. “Merger Illusions and Externalities,” (with Janusz A. Ordover), Eastern Economic Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 19-21, January 1976.
  91. “Auctions and Economic Theory,” Bidding and Auctioning for Procurement and Allocation, (Yakov Amihud, ed), New York University Press, pp. 3-13, 1976.
  92. “Auctioning Bohm-Bawerk’s Horses,” International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 195-215, December 1974.
  93. “Core Allocations and Competitive Equilibrium–A Survey,” Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, Vol. 33, No. 3-4, pp. 281-313, September 1973.