

Intrinsic and Instrumental Reciprocity: An Experimental Study*

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Abstract

In the context of an infinitely repeated veto game, we devise an experiment to distinguish between alternative explanations of generous behavior (accepting negative payoffs): altruism, intrinsic backward-looking reciprocity (reciprocal kindness), and instrumental forward-looking (or equilibrium) reciprocity. Our results are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that observed sacrifices are motivated by equilibrium selfish, forward-looking reciprocal behavior although we find a more subtle way in which kindness reciprocity affects behavior.

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1 Introduction

Reciprocity is a significant part of the behavioral repertoire of humans (and other animals). People seem willing to sacrifice their material well being to help others. As summarized by Sobel (2005) such behavior comes in two basic varieties which he labels "intrinsic" and "instrumental" reciprocity. In intrinsic reciprocity, a kind (unkind) act by one social agent changes the preferences of the people he interacts with in such a way as to elicit kindness (unkindness) in response. Intrinsic reciprocity is therefore preference based and likely to depend on the context of the game being played and the perceived intentions of the players.¹ In these theories, because reciprocity is motivated by a positive (negative) interpretation of the intentions of one's opponent, how one arrives at a final payoff vector is an important component in determining whether behavior should be rewarded or punished. Such theories are "backward looking" since they rely on history to define the kindness of one's opponent. Other preference based theories of reciprocity include altruism and the interdependent preference theories of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). These theories, while preference based, differ from intrinsic models by ignoring the process through which final outcomes are determined and concentrating on the final distributions themselves in isolation of the context of the game determining them. In other words, in these theories the preferences of agents are fixed and do not change in response to the behavior of others.

In contrast to intrinsic reciprocity, Sobel (2005) classifies reciprocity as instrumental if it is part of a repeated game strategy where agents sacrifice their short term gains in an effort to increase their long run (discounted) payoff. In such models, agents are capable of being perfectly selfish yet reciprocal behavior is observed as part of the equilibrium of the game. If Folk Theorems apply, a wide variety of behavior can emerge along with a wide variety of equilibrium outcomes all determined by selfish agents who are "forward looking" in the sense that they care about the impact of their actions today on the perceptions and actions of their opponent in the future. The logic of the Folk Theorem is the logic of instrumental reciprocity (see Rubinstein (1979), Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) and Abreu (1988), and more directly

¹See Rabin (1993) and Segal and Sobel (2007, 2008) and Blanco, Celen and Schotter (2010) for examples of such theories as well as Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) for examples of reciprocity in the context of psychological games and Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2003) and Blount (1995) for experimental evidence supporting intrinsic reciprocity models in the context of bargaining (ultimatum) games and Fehr and Gächter (1998) and Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger (1997) for examples of the impact of reciprocity on markets and contracts.

for this paper Cabral (2005)).

Previous experimental literature has had a difficult time in distinguishing between these two types of reciprocity since virtually all of the experiments run have been conducted as either single-shot or finitely repeated games.² In one-shot or finitely-repeated-game experiments instrumental reciprocity is hard to identify since it requires that the game being played have an infinite horizon which, to our knowledge, none of the previous experiments have had. The most prominent exception is a recent paper by Dreber, Fudenberg and Rand (2010) which uses correlations between behavior in an infinitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma game and a static Dictator game to demonstrate, as we do, that selfish motivations are mostly responsible for cooperation in the Prisoners' Dilemma game.

When reciprocal behavior is observed in finitely repeated games (where backward induction should eliminate it) some have argued that such behavior, while seemingly intrinsically motivated reciprocity, is actually the result of subjects inappropriately importing selfish infinitely repeated game logic and strategies from life into the lab. Evidence of this phenomenon is cleverly presented by Reuben and Seutens (2011). Alternatively, for evolutionary reasons, subjects may be conditioned to be reciprocal outside the lab where infinitely repeated situations are more abundant and mistake the lab as a place where such strategies apply.

In this paper we embed our experiment in an infinitely repeated veto game of the type studied theoretically by Cabral (2005). In such veto games, in each of an infinite number of periods, Nature generates a pair of payoffs, one for each player. Although the sum of the players' payoffs is positive, one of the players may receive a negative payoff. Efficient equilibria thus require that players inter-temporally exchange favors, i.e., accept negative payoffs in some period with the expectation that such a favor will be reciprocated later in the interaction. An additional advantage of the repeated veto game is that, unlike most other repeated games, it admits a unique efficient equilibrium in the class of trigger strategy equilibria.

²This is true of ultimatum games (Guth, Schmittberger and Schuarze, 1982), dictatorship games (Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985), trust games (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995), gift exchange games (Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger, 1997), and promise games (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006). Charness and Haruvy (2002) perform an experiment that tries to separate altruism, equity, and reciprocity-based motives but in a non-infinite setting. While in the static version of such experiments it is true that reciprocity behavior can not be exhibited by selfish agents, in an infinitely repeated game selfish people are perfectly capable of acting in what appears to be an altruistic or reciprocal manner.

Some of the few exceptions are Engle-Warnick and Ruffle (2006), Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2006), and Schotter and Sopher (2007). The latter use what they call "intergenerational" games.

We consider this equilibrium as the natural prediction of the selfish, rational behavior model and use its predictions as guide in our empirical section.

The repeated veto game is of significant theoretical and applied interest. Cabral (2005) applies it to the problem of international merger policy, that is, the situation when a merger must be approved by multiple national authorities. A related context is that of interest rate setting by the European Central Bank, where individual member countries have veto power of changes on the interest rate level. An additional, closer to home, example is that of faculty recruitment, where different groups (e.g., micro and macro) have different preferences and hiring opportunities arise at an uneven rate.

All of these situations require that participants exchange favors over time. Hence, from the point of view of experimental economics, the infinitely repeated veto game provides an excellent testing ground for the relative importance of altruism, intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity and selfishness as determinants of behavior. This is what we attempt to do in this paper.

Methodologically, our paper makes several contributions since there are several features of our design that are new to the infinitely repeated game literature. In particular, as mentioned above, it is one of the first papers to examine reciprocal behavior in infinitely repeated games. Second, we present an innovation of some methodological use that ensures that no repeated interaction ends before at least some predetermined number of periods have transpired (in our experiment six) despite the fact that we use a probabilistic continuation rule to simulate discounting.³ We do this by using a technique that makes the first six periods in any interaction deterministic with discounting yet allows these periods to blend into the stochastically ending portion of the experiment (periods 7 and above) in a behaviorally continuous manner. This allows us to make sure that we do not waste money on games that end "too soon". Third, two of our treatments have the added feature that when the last period is stochastically determined we inform the subjects that such period has arrived (see Reuben and Seutens (2010) for a similar treatment). In other words, while we use a stochastic stopping rule to end the infinitely repeated game, in two of our four treatments we inform our subjects when the last period has arrived. In the context of our experiments, this allows us to identify whether their behavior up until that point was motivated by reciprocal or selfish motives.

Our results indicate that both motives, intrinsic and instrumental, affect reciprocal behavior in the

³See Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) for an excellent example of the approach where termination is stochastic.

veto game. While we will present some strong evidence that behavior is heavily instrumental, our data also offers support for intrinsic motives. For example, while our results indicate that of the 132 subjects in our experiment 77.3% can be categorized as being motivated instrumentally, there are a number of subtle ways in which intrinsic motivations manifest themselves. For example, as we will see, the main way people reciprocate in our experiment is to exchange favors over time. While intrinsic reciprocity would imply that people are more likely to accept negative offers when their partner has a high positive offer, we fail to find this to be true. However, what we do find is that over time, as subjects prove themselves to be kind, their partners become willing to accept increasingly more negative offers in order to reciprocate. Put differently, kindness leads one's partner to be willing to make bigger sacrifices in order to keep the reciprocal relationship alive. Further, in one of our treatments we inform subjects when they are playing the last period of their random interaction. Since this presents subjects with a one-shot game, one might expect that if subjects were instrumental they would never accept any negative offer at this point since, under instrumental reciprocity, the only reason to sacrifice for one's partner is to keep the long term cooperative agreement alive, a motive that does not exist when a player is informed that he is in the last period. We find, however, that 11.2% of the negative offers were accepted although the subjects knew that it was the last periods and they would be matched with someone else, indicating that their motives must be something other than instrumental.

In this paper we will proceed as follows. In Section 2 we will present the theory underlying infinitely repeated veto games in the context of the experiment we conduct. In Section 3 we present our hypotheses while in Section 4, we present our experimental design. In Section 5 we present our results. Finally in Section 6 we offer the conclusions.

2 Theories of agent behavior

Our theoretical analysis is based on the following *repeated veto game*.⁴ Two players interact over an infinite series of periods. Both players discount future payoffs according to the discount factor δ . In each period t , Nature determines a *proposal*, a pair of payoff values $w_t = (w_{1t}, w_{2t})$ drawn from the set S according

⁴See Cabral (2005) for a more extensive discussion of the repeated veto game and an application to international merger policy.

to the c.d.f. $F(w)$, which we assume is smooth. Both players observe both values in w_t . Both players then simultaneously decide whether or not to approve the proposal w_t . If both players accept, then player i receives payoff w_{it} . If at least one of the players rejects the proposal, then both players receive zero. Specifically, let x_{it} be player i 's decision at time t , where $x_{it} = 1$ denotes approval and $x_{it} = 0$ denotes veto. Player i 's payoff in period t is then given by

$$\pi_{it} = w_{it} x_{it} x_{jt}$$

Figure 1 illustrates a possible set S (where for simplicity we drop the time component of the subscript of w). All points in S lead to a positive aggregate payoff.⁵ We can consider three partitions of S . Points in region A yield a positive payoff to both players. Points in region D_i have the interesting property that (a) aggregate payoff is positive, (b) player j 's payoff is negative.




Figure 1: Payoff structure in a repeated veto game

It is straightforward to show that one equilibrium of this infinitely repeated game would be to play a static Nash equilibrium in every period where each player rejects all negative payoffs for himself and accepts only positive payoffs no matter what offer is made to his opponent, or alternatively rejects all

⁵Cabral (2005) considers the more general case when S includes points with negative aggregate payoff.

offers no matter whether they are positive or negative.⁶ Experimental and anecdotal evidence suggest, however, that subjects are frequently “nice” to other players, that is, approve proposals yielding negative payoff for them but a positive aggregate payoff (that is, points in regions D_i). What theory can then explain the evidence? Our purpose in the present paper is to attempt to answer this question.

There are several reasons why outcomes do not correspond to the repeated play of static Nash equilibria. One first reason is that players care about other players’ payoff: altruism or other regarding preferences. A second reason is that players follow some notion of reciprocity in their behavior: to the extent that their partner has been kind in the past, reciprocating such kindness yields positive utility. Finally, a natural explanation based on economic theory is that the outcome of cooperation corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game which is different from the static Nash equilibrium; that is, given repetition, players might achieve an equilibrium whereby some points in regions D_i get approved. We next develop each theoretical hypothesis in greater detail.

◇ Altruism and Other-Regarding Preferences. An explanation for “generous” behavior (proposals in region D_i that are approved) is altruism, the idea that a player’s utility includes the amount earned by the other player. This is captured by $\Phi(w_{it}, w_{jt}) : S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. Specifically, suppose that, in each period, each player’s utility is given by his payoff plus a fixed positive coefficient α times the amount earned by the other player. Suppose, for the moment, that players are myopic, that is, they do not consider the continuation of the game. Such altruistic preferences imply the following definition.

Definition 1 (altruism) *Under myopic, altruistic play, $x_{it} = 1$ if and only if $\Phi(w_{it}, w_{jt}) > 0$, where $\frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial w_{it}} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial w_{jt}} > 0$.*

Figure 2 illustrates the linear case, when $\Phi(w_{it}, w_{jt}) = w_{it} + \alpha w_{jt}$ (where $\alpha > 0$ is the coefficient of altruism). In this case, we expect all proposals to the Nash equilibrium above the ℓ_1 and ℓ_2 lines to be approved.

⁶As we will discuss later, this second equilibrium is unlikely to be played especially since it is weakly dominated by the first. Still, we list it because it is a logical possibility.




Figure 2: Altruistic, myopic equilibrium

Note that a similar result would hold if our subjects had various other types of other-regarding preferences such as those specified by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) since in both of these theories the decision to accept or reject an offer at any time t would depend both on one's own offer and that of one's opponent.

As we will see later, we need not restrict ourselves to myopic altruism since even in an infinitely repeated game, if we assume that subjects use trigger strategies, the only efficient trigger-strategy equilibrium where people have non-selfish preferences involves subjects making their accept/reject decisions at each point in time on the basis of both offers and not just their own. This will not be the case when subjects have selfish preferences as will be true in the instrumental reciprocity model.

◇ Kindness (backward-looking) reciprocity. An alternative explanation for “generous” behavior (proposals in region D_i that are approved) is given by what we will call intrinsic or “kindness reciprocity.” Such explanations are backward looking since a player looks back at the previous behavior of his opponent, makes a judgement about how kind she has been, and then decides whether to accept a negative payoff based on how negative the payoff is and how kind the opponent has been.

The obvious question is how can we measure the kindness of a player? While there may be many ways to do this it is clear that whatever index one uses should take into account not only how much of a sacrifice (how negative a payment was accepted) a player has made in the past to help his opponent but

also how much did a given sacrifice increase the opponent's payoff. For example, it is clear that player i is being kind to player j when he accepts a large negative amount. However, for any given sacrifice, we would consider player i as being more kind if the payoff of player j increased a lot rather than a little.

For that purpose, we define the kindness⁷ of player i toward player j at time period τ as:

$$h_{i\tau}(x_{i\tau}|w_{i\tau}, w_{j\tau}) = [(x_{i\tau} - 1) - \frac{w_{i\tau}}{100}] \frac{w_{j\tau}}{100} I(w_{i\tau} < 0)$$

In this function $x_{i\tau}$ takes a value of 1 when an offer in period τ is accepted and zero otherwise while $I(w_{i\tau} < 0)$ is an indicator function taking a value of 1 when the offer to player i in period τ is negative (we are assuming that one does not exhibit kindness when one accepts a positive offer)⁸. Looking at the right hand side of our kindness index we notice two terms, one inside the square brackets and one outside. The term inside the brackets we will call the negative sacrifice component since it measures how much of a sacrifice player i is making when he accepts a given negative offer $w_{i\tau}$ in an effort to help player j . To understand this term, consider a given period τ and suppose that $w_{i\tau} = -60$. If player i accepts this proposal (so that $x_{i\tau} = 1$), then we say he is being kind to his partner to the tune of $.60 = (x_{i\tau} - 1) - \frac{w_{i\tau}}{100}$ where $x_{i\tau} = 1$ and $w_{i\tau} = -60$. The maximum value of kindness in a given period is therefore 1; it corresponds to the case when player i accepts a sacrifice of -100 . Suppose however that the player rejects the same proposal of -60 (so $x_{i\tau} = 0$). We then say he is being kind (or rather, unkind) to the tune of $-.40 = (x_{i\tau} - 1) - \frac{w_{i\tau}}{100}$, where $x_{i\tau} = 0$ and $w_{i\tau} = -60$. Intuitively, the idea is that kindness corresponds to accepting large negative offers. In the limit when $w_{i\tau} = -100$ is accepted, we get one unit of kindness. Conversely, unkindness corresponds to rejecting offers that would imply a small sacrifice to player i . In the limit when $w_{i\tau} = 0$ is rejected, we get one negative unit of kindness (or one unit of unkindness). Accepting an offer that implies a small loss is not considered to be either kind or unkind. In the limit when $w_{i\tau} = 0$ is accepted, we get $(x_{i\tau} - 1) - \frac{w_{i\tau}}{100} = 0$. Likewise, rejecting an offer that would imply a large loss is not considered to be either kind or unkind. In the limit when $w_{i\tau} = -100$ is rejected we again get $(x_{i\tau} - 1) - \frac{w_{i\tau}}{100} = 0$.

⁷It is important to note that this kindness index is a generalization of Rabin's (1993) index by incorporating the amount of sacrifice and benefit in the index.

⁸It is possible that we should consider positive offers since it may be that one way to exhibit kindness is to reject a positive offer as a way of preventing one's opponent, whom you care about, from trying to be kind to you by accepting a large negative offer. Such behavior is rare so we ignore it in our kindness index.

To explain the second term, again suppose that $w_{i\tau} = -60$. If player i accepts this proposal (so that $x_{i\tau} = 1$) when $w_{j\tau} = 61$ or when $w_{j\tau} = 91$, we say he is being kind but the magnitude of his kindness will be higher when $w_{j\tau} = 91$ than when $w_{j\tau} = 61$ since his kind action will benefit player j more when $w_{j\tau} = 91$. Similarly, if he rejects this proposal, he is being unkind and again the magnitude will be higher when $w_{j\tau} = 91$ than when $w_{j\tau} = 61$.

If players are reciprocal, we would expect a player's utility from approving a proposal to be increasing in his partner's past kindness. Hence in order to determine the kindness of player i toward player j up until period τ , it might be natural to simply add up $h_{it}(x_{it}|w_{i\tau}, w_{j\tau})$ from periods 1 to $\tau - 1$. However, not all past periods are likely to be weighted equally in the mind of player j. He may give more recent periods an increased weight and place declining weights on the more distant past. To capture this fact we impose a set of declining weights on past actions of player i and formulate his cumulative kindness at period τ as follows:

$$k_{i\tau} = \sum_{t=1}^{\tau-1} \lambda^{(\tau-t-1)} h_{it}(x_{it}|w_{i\tau}, w_{j\tau}).$$

If players employ kindness to motivate their reciprocity then this leads to a different prediction regarding the outcome of the game:

Definition 2 (kindness (intrinsic) reciprocity) *In a kindness equilibrium, $x_{it} = 1$ if and only if $\Phi(w_{it}, k_{jt}, w_{jt}) > 0$, where $\frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial w_{it}} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial k_{jt}} > 0$.*

In the particular linear case, a proposal is approved if and only if $w_{it} + \alpha k_{jt} + \beta w_{jt} > 0$, where $\alpha > 0$. In other words, if kindness matters

for some $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ and for one of the indices, the coefficient of the kindness should be strictly positive.

◇ Equilibrium (forward-looking) reciprocity. Economists have understood for a long time that selfish, individual utility maximization is consistent with the observation of cooperative behavior when games are infinitely repeated. While it is possible to define an infinite set of possible strategies in the repeated veto game (as in any repeated game), we concentrate, as is often the case, on trigger strategy equilibria. In fact, in the econometric analysis of our data we will try to identify whether our subjects employed the efficient equilibrium which, as we will demonstrate, can only be reached using trigger strategies. We do

this not necessarily because we believe, a priori, that subjects will naturally gravitate to these types of strategies but rather to furnish a precise prediction from which we can evaluate behavior. If observed behavior differs qualitatively from the behavior consistent with efficient trigger strategies, then clearly we selected an incorrect benchmark for our data analysis. As we will see, however, the behavior of our subjects is broadly consistent with the use of trigger strategies while not precisely efficient ones. Further, since there are an infinite number of Nash equilibria, if we did not select one for predictive purposes, then any behavior observed is likely to be rationalized by some Nash equilibrium, making the theory vacuous.

The idea of a trigger strategy equilibrium is to consider a “cooperative phase,” where each player chooses $x_i^C(w_i, w_j)$; and a “punishment phase,” where each player plays the static Nash equilibrium strategy $x_i^N(w_i, w_j)$; and the rule is that players choose $x^C(w_i, w_j)$ so long as all players have chosen $x^C(w_i, w_j)$ in previous periods.

Specifically, let $x_i^k(w_i, w_j) : S \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be an action mapping from the set of possible proposals into the set of possible actions in each period, where 1 corresponds to approval, 0 to veto; and $k = C, N$. With some abuse of notation, let x_{it} be player i 's actual choice at time t . Define the following cooperation indicator:

$$c_t \equiv \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x_{i\tau} = x_i^C(w_{i\tau}, w_{j\tau}), \forall i, \tau < t \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Then a trigger-strategy equilibrium is defined as follows.

Definition 3 *A trigger-strategy equilibrium is characterized by strategies*

$$x_{it} = \begin{cases} x_i^C & \text{if } c_t = 1 \\ x_i^N & \text{if } c_t = 0 \end{cases}$$

Notice that there is a Nash equilibrium strategy which is simply to approve a proposal if payoff is positive: $x_i^N(w_i, w_j) = 1$ iff $w_i \geq 0$. As we will see below, this is not the only Nash equilibrium that can be used in the punishment phase. However, depending on what Nash equilibrium is assumed to occur, we can sustain different payoffs in equilibrium. We are interested in characterizing those equilibria that are optimal given an out-of-equilibrium threat.

Definition 4 *An optimal equilibrium is a trigger strategy equilibrium that maximizes the sum of the players' expected discounted payoffs.*

Proposition 1 (*Equilibrium (Instrumental) Reciprocity*) For a given threat to be used in the punishment phase, there exists a unique optimal equilibrium, and it is such that $x_i^C(w_i, w_j) = 1$ if and only if $w_i \geq -l_i$, where l_i is increasing in δ and $l_i = 0$ if $\delta = 0$.

A proof may be found in the appendix. Proposition 1 is illustrated by Figure 3.




Figure 3: Optimal Threshold Equilibrium

Proposition 1 states that along the equilibrium path of the optimal equilibrium, all proposals in S such that $w_1 > -l_1$ and $w_2 > -l_2$ are approved, and all the other ones are vetoed. Furthermore, for a given static Nash equilibrium to be used as a threat strategy in the punishment phase, there is only one pair (l_1, l_2) that maximizes the sum of equilibrium payoffs.

Although in any Nash equilibrium of the one-shot version of this game, a player rejects any offer that gives negative payoffs to himself, there are multiplicity of Nash equilibria of this one-shot game. Some examples of the Nash equilibria of the one-shot game are when a player accepts a proposal if and only if his payoff is positive, or both players accept if and only if $w_1 > 10$ and $w_2 > 5$, or rejecting any offer.

During the punishment phase players may use any of these strategies. In the proof of the Proposition 1, we establish that whichever Nash strategy of the one-shot game is used as a threat, there exists a unique threshold strategy that maximizes the sum of the payoffs. Obviously, by using any of these strategies as a threat in the punishment phase, one supports several strategies as a part of the equilibrium of an infinitely

repeated game. For example, for the parameters used in the experiment, the threshold is -27 if accepting only positive offers is used as threat; it is -88 if rejecting any offer is used as a threat.⁹ One may argue that despite the multiplicity of equilibria of the one-shot game, accepting only positive proposals is also the weakly dominant strategy and it might be unrealistic to think that the subjects will use the weakly dominated strategies as threats.

◇ Equilibrium (forward-looking) reciprocity with altruistic preferences. As we mentioned before we need not limit ourselves when discussing altruism to myopic behavior. The question then arises whether it is possible that when agents with such preferences interact over an infinite horizon they employ the same type of threshold trigger strategies as our selfish agents. The answer is no as long as we again restrict ourselves to efficient trigger strategies. In other words, if people are altruistic then in order to produce an efficient equilibrium in trigger strategies agents must take into account the payoffs of the agents they face no matter what threat is used. Since we find strong evidence that this is not the case, we again are presented with support for the notion that thresholds are used only by selfish agents.

These considerations yield the following proposition:

Proposition 2 (*Equilibrium with Altruistic Preferences*) *If agents have altruistic preferences then no optimal trigger-strategy equilibrium exists in threshold strategies no matter what punishment threat is used and no matter what the functional form of the subjects' altruistic utility function is.*

A proof may be found in the appendix.

3 Hypotheses

The theory of instrumental reciprocity being tested here is characterized by two main features; thresholds and triggers. Thresholds characterize the cooperative phase while triggers characterize the punishment phase. If thresholds are employed by our subjects then we can rule out altruism or other-regarding preferences as a behavioral explanation since thresholds imply that the probability of accepting an offer in any round is independent of the offer made to one's opponent, while altruism and other-regarding preferences

⁹In the results section, we report thresholds as $-l$ rather than l to emphasize that the subjects accept negative payoffs for themselves.

suggest that the probability of accepting an offer depends on the offer of one's cohort. Hypotheses 1 and 2 concern these two features of our equilibrium.

Hypothesis 1 *Thresholds: Subjects base their rejections of offers on the basis of a threshold above which offers are accepted and below which they are rejected. The probability that player i accepts a proposal is increasing in player i 's payoff and independent of j 's payoff.*

The first part of this hypothesis obviously tests the threshold property of our model while the second part allows us to separate the impact of Instrumental Reciprocity from Altruism (or other-regarding preferences in general) since, as stated above, Instrumental Reciprocity with thresholds indicates that the rejection of an offer by subject i is independent of the offer made to subject j , while Altruism and other-regarding preference theories indicate that the probability of rejection depends on both offers. If we discover that including the consideration of an opponent's offer adds nothing to our ability to predict the probability that an offer is accepted, then we have provided evidence against altruistic and other-regarding preferences and in support of instrumental reciprocity.

Note that the fact that people use thresholds is only part of the demonstration that they were adhering to a forward looking reciprocal equilibrium since such an equilibrium also requires subjects to punish their opponent for the remainder of their interaction when they deviate. The punishment is to accept only non-negative offers. This yields the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2 *Trigger Strategies: Subjects employ trigger strategies when playing the infinitely repeated veto game.*

As Sobel (2005) has indicated, Intrinsic or preference-based reciprocity is a function of the previous behavior of one's opponent. If one's opponent has behaved in a kind manner, then such kindness changes the attitude of a decision maker towards his opponent by increasing the weight attached to his or her payoff in the decision maker's utility function. The opposite is true if the opponent behaves badly. Hypothesis 3 tests this Intrinsic Backward-Looking (or Reciprocal Kindness) hypothesis and distinguishes it from both Altruism and Instrumental Reciprocity since neither of those theories are influenced by the past behavior of one's opponent. Instrumental reciprocity simply compares the current offer to the subject's threshold while Altruism looks at the value of both current offers. Neither looks at the previous behavior of one's opponent.

Hypothesis 3 *Kindness and Backward-Looking Reciprocity: The probability that player i accepts a proposal is increasing in player j 's kindness index.*

While both Instrumental and Intrinsic Reciprocity exhibit reciprocal behavior, they do so for different reasons. With Intrinsic Reciprocity, a subject is rewarded for previous kindness while with Instrumental reciprocity one cooperates (accepts a negative offer) in period t in the hope that such cooperation will be reciprocated in the future. This would imply that if it were announced to both players that their relationship would end in the current period, then we should not observe any subject accepting a negative offer in that period if he or she subscribed to the Instrumental or Forward Looking -Kindness theory (since there is no future left), while a subscriber of the Intrinsic or Backward-Looking kindness theory would reciprocate if the previous kindness level of his or her opponent were high enough. In other words, when there is no tomorrow there is no role for Forward-Looking reciprocity yet Backward-looking reciprocity may still operate.

Hypothesis 4 *The probability that player i accepts a negative proposal in any period t_i depends on whether the subject is informed that that period is the last period in the relationship he is in.*

Of these four hypotheses, Hypotheses 1-2 investigate Instrumental (Forward-Looking) Reciprocity. While Hypothesis 1 attempts to separate it from Myopic Altruism, Hypothesis 2 investigates whether trigger strategies were used. Hypotheses 3 and 4 try to identify whether Intrinsic (Backward Looking) or Instrumental (Forward Looking) behavior is what is observed in the data.

In the next two sections we describe the experiment we designed to test these various hypotheses (Section 4) and analyze statistically the data produced by the experiment (Section 5).

4 Experiment procedures and design

Our experimental design was created in an effort to test the theories described above. While we ran four treatments (to be described below) the experimental task engaged in by our subjects in each treatment was identical and can be described as follows. In each period, a pair of potential payoffs or offers (w_1, w_2) is randomly determined. These values are uniformly drawn from the set determined by the following

conditions:

$$-100 \leq w_i \leq 100, 0 \leq w_1 + w_2 \leq 100$$

This set is illustrated by the shaded area in Figure 4.




Figure 4: Experimental proposals generated.

Both players observe both values (w_1, w_2) . Players then simultaneously decide whether or not to approve the proposal. If both players approve the proposal, then each gets a payoff w_i . If at least one player vetoes the proposal, then both players receive 0.

The underlying model we test is one involving an infinitely repeated game. Following the common practice, we implement the infinitely repeated game as a repeated game that ends after each period with a continuation probability δ (hazard rate $(1 - \delta)$). In fact, for a risk-neutral player time discount and the probability a game will end are substitute elements in the discount factor.

This procedure creates an obvious practical problem, namely the possibility that the actual experiment lasts for a very short time (maybe just one period). In order to obviate this problem, we created a minimum time horizon, T_{\min} . Play of the game lasts at least T_{\min} periods for sure; and for $t > T_{\min}$, we apply the hazard rate $1 - \delta$. Moreover, for $t < T_{\min}$ we introduce a payoff multiplier which decreases at rate δ . This implies that, for a risk-neutral player, the future looks the same at every period of the game.

More generally, the formula for the multiplier x_t is

$$x_t = \begin{cases} \delta^{(t-T_{\min})} & \text{if } t \leq T_{\min} \\ 1 & \text{if } t > T_{\min}, \end{cases}$$

and the values used in the experiment are given in Table 1.

Table 1:

Period Payoff Multipliers	
Period	Multiplier
1	3.05
2	2.44
3	1.95
4	1.56
5	1.25
6	1.00
7+	1.00

Note that in all periods before period 7, where stochastic discounting starts, the payoffs are multiplied by a constant greater than 1. For example, all payoffs earned in period 1 are multiplied by 3.05 making them more valuable than those earned in period 4, where the multiplier is only 1.56. The multiplier decreases until period 6 where it is equal to 1 and remains at that level from that point on. Note, however, that in period 7 the hazard rate δ takes over and it is in place from period 7 onward.

Table 2 presents the parameter values we used in our experiment. The minimum number of periods was set at $T_{\min} = 6$ and the discount rate set at $\delta = .8$ (that is, after the sixth period the particular game ended with probability 20%). Each subject played this “infinitely” repeated game ten times (that is, there were 10 rounds). Finally, the resulting equilibrium thresholds under the efficient equilibrium hypothesis is given by -27 (see the Appendix for the calculations).

In the experiment, 132 subjects were recruited from the undergraduate population at New York University via an electronic recruitment system that sends all subjects in the subject pool an e-mail offering

them an opportunity to participate. Subjects played for francs which were converted into dollars at the rate of .6c per Franc.

Table 2: Experimental Parameters and Equilibrium Values

Parameter	Value
Discount rate	0.8
Number of Rounds	10
Min number of periods (T_{\min})	6
Equilibrium threshold	-27

4.1 Experimental Design

The experiment consisted of four treatments which differed by the matching protocol used and the level of information offered to the subjects in the last period of each round. In all treatments, subjects played ten rounds of an “infinitely” repeated game. Subjects did not know ex-ante how many periods each round would last for, though they knew that there was a random continuation probability of $\delta = 0.8$. In two treatments (Treatments 2 and 4), subjects were randomly rematched with a new partner in each round, that is, after each “infinitely” repeated game (randomly) ended, while in the other two treatments (Treatments 1 and 3) subjects stayed with their first round match for the entire 10 rounds of the experiment. Furthermore, in Treatments 2 and 3, before playing the last period of each round, subjects were told that the end-period had arrived, that is, that the period they were about to begin would be the last period of the current “infinitely” repeated game. In the remaining two treatments, (Treatment 1 and 4), no such information was offered. In short, we conducted a 2 x 2 design with the treatments designated as Fixed Matching Low information (Treatment 1), Random Matching High Information (Treatment 2), Fixed Matching High Information (Treatment 3) and Random Matching Low Information (Treatment 4).

We ran these treatments for two reasons. First, we used random matching because we feared that, with fixed matching, the ten rounds of the “infinitely” repeated game might lose their independence. For example, subjects may build up a kindness reputation that spans across rounds. For other purposes, fixed matching is desirable. Second, we varied the last period information in order to compare the relative merits of the forward and backward reciprocity hypotheses. Table 3 presents our experiment’s design.

Table 3: Experimental Design

Treatment	Matching	Information: Last Period Known	# of Subjects
1	Fixed	No	30
2	Random	Yes	28
3	Fixed	Yes	32
4	Random	No	42
Total			132

5 Results

In this section we will present the results of our experiment. We will do this by testing each of the hypotheses stated above on the individual level using the data generated by our experiment.

5.1 Hypothesis 1

To discuss Hypothesis 1 we will start with a descriptive analysis.

Figures 5a and 5b display the set of offers presented to two subjects in our Treatment 1, along with an indication of which offers were rejected dark (blue) diamonds and which were accepted light (purple) squares.

Figures 5a and 5b: Individual Acceptance Behavior




Figure 5a




Figure 5b

If Proposition 1 (and Hypothesis 1) is predictive of behavior, then in these graphs we should see a sharp division between offers that were accepted and those that were rejected with a rejection boundary separating the two that has an infinite slope. In other words, it should not be the case that the boundary between accepted and rejected offers has a negative finite slope.

As we can see, in Figure 5a this is certainly the case. For this subject (except for one observation) rejection behavior has the threshold property; offers above the threshold are accepted and those below are rejected regardless of the offer they imply for their opponent. Obviously, this was not the case for all subjects, which is why we also present Figure 5b that shows the behavior of a subject whose attitudes appear to be more consistent with altruism since he seems willing to accept somewhat disadvantaged offers as long as they offer a large gain for his opponent. As our more formal regression analysis will indicate, these types of subjects are more the overwhelming exception than the rule.

Figures 6a and 6b (again from the Treatment 1) look at the data in another way. They present the acceptance behavior of subjects 19 and 13 in Treatment 1 over the 10 rounds of their participation in the game. On the horizontal axis we have the offer made to a given subject while on the vertical axis we measure two things. The first is a binary $\{0,1\}$ variable that takes a value of zero if an offer was rejected and a value of 1 if it was accepted. Second we measure the probability that a given offer is accepted using a logit regression where the binary accept/reject variable is regressed on a subject's own offer. If threshold behavior characterized a subject's behavior, then, when a simple logit function is fit to this data to explain acceptance behavior, our estimated logit regression should be a step function indicating that the probability of acceptance for offers below the step (threshold) is zero while it is one for offers above the threshold.

Figures 6a and 6b: Acceptance Functions




Figure 6a




Figure 6b

In Figure 6a we present our acceptance/rejection logit function for Subject 19 estimated by regressing his binary $\{0,1\}$ response to his payoff offer. Note that Subject 19 behaves exactly as a subject should if he or she was adhering to a strict threshold acceptance function. All offers below his threshold of -15

are accepted with probability 0 (rejected with probability 1) while those above the threshold are accepted with probability 1.

Subject 13 depicted in Figure 6b is a little different since his reject and accept regions for offers overlap. This means that this subject does not have a clear acceptance threshold. However, note that he is not far from perfect threshold behavior.

This discussion naturally leads us to look for a metric to use in assessing how far away a subject is from step function behavior and the pseudo threshold he is using. To do this we employ a very simple one which is to find the threshold which is such that we can fit a step-function to the data exactly by eliminating the minimal number of observations. To illustrate this, consider Figure 6b and Subject 13. From the logit acceptance function depicted there we see that, as opposed to Subject 19, this subject is not using a strict threshold acceptance function. This is true because the set of rejected and accepted offers overlap so there is not a clear separation between the sets of rejected and accepted offers. However, note that if we simply remove 2 observations from his data set (those to the right of the straight line on the bottom) we can establish a strict step function so this subject is 2 observations away from behaving as if he or she had a threshold strategy with a step at -10. Our metric then would award him a score of 2 and define his pseudo threshold as -10.

Tables 4a-4d presents, for each treatment, the estimated thresholds for each subject along with the number of observations that need to be eliminated to create perfect threshold behavior. This is followed by the percentage of the data not explained by these thresholds. Note that the exact threshold can not be uniquely defined by our procedure since there may be regions where no observations occur which straddle the actual threshold used. For that reason we provide two thresholds per subject (min and max) each of which can be used to estimate our threshold along with the mean threshold. In the remainder of the paper when we refer to a subject's threshold we will be referring to the mean stated in this table.

Tables 4a-d here

As we can see from Tables 4a-4d, while not all subjects employed a perfect threshold strategy, many of them were in fact close to doing so in the sense that, on average, we only need to remove a few observations from each one in order to establish perfect threshold behavior. More precisely, note that over all rounds we only need to eliminate on average 5.43, 5.96, 5.46, and 5.5 observations from any

subject in our four treatments respectively in order to establish perfect step-function behavior for him or her.¹⁰ In addition, the maintained hypothesis that subjects used a threshold strategy is successful in explaining a large percentage of the data. For example, over all rounds the mean percentage of the data explained by our estimated thresholds are 94.38%, 94.05%, 94.32%, and 94.13% for treatments 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. This is strong support for the as if assumption that threshold behavior was operative.

These statistics actually under estimate how well threshold behavior fits our data. For example, from the logit regressions we will report later on in this section, our subjects naturally fall into two categories; those whose behavior can be explained exclusively with reference to one's own offer and those who take the offers of one's opponent into account as well.

Among the former group (constituting 102 of our 132 subjects) the mean number of observations that need to be eliminated in order to perfectly fit our rejection data with a step function is 3.2 while among those (25 subjects) who also care about one's opponent's offer (altruistic or intrinsically reciprocal types), the same number is 14.1. In other words, if we look only at the 77.3% of our subjects who exhibit strictly selfish behavior, our closeness index implies a closer fit.¹¹

To test the second part of Hypothesis 1, we estimate a logit acceptance/rejection function for each subject i by estimating the probability that i accepts a offer w_{it} given that w_{jt} was offered to his pair member. We also include our previously defined opponent's kindness' variable, k_{jt} , in this regression, indicating the kindness of a subject's opponent up until the current period. In other words, we code the variable a_{it} as a zero if the offer in period t was rejected and 1 if it was accepted, and we regress a_{it} on w_{it} , w_{jt} , k_{jt} and a constant. Since k_{jt} is a function of λ , for each subject, we searched over λ , using values between 0 and 1 in steps of 0.10, to find that λ which maximized the likelihood of the regression. These results are reported in Table 5.

If Hypothesis 1 is accepted, then the coefficient on the w_{jt} variable should be insignificantly different from zero while that of the w_{it} should be positive and significantly so. Note that accepting Hypothesis 1 is equivalent to rejecting the Myopic Altruistic or other-regarding preferences since those theories require a significantly positive coefficient on the w_{jt} variable. Tables 5 presents the results of our logit regressions run at the individual level for our four treatments.

¹⁰The median of unexplained points are 3, 4, 3.5, and 2.5 in our four treatments respectively.

¹¹Only 5 subjects can not be classified at all.

Table 5 here

As Table 5 clearly indicates, it appears that the probability of rejecting an offer for subjects is primarily a function of the offer they receive and not that received by their opponent. For example, over all subjects and all treatments of the 132 subjects who participated in our experiment,¹² 13 subjects had behavior that was perfectly described by thresholds in the sense that a step function (explaining rejections as a function of a subject's own offer) perfectly fit their data, 18 subjects had almost a perfect fit (only 1 unexplained point). For these subjects the estimated logit regression did not converge yet it is obvious that they only considered their own offer when contemplating rejections.¹³ Including these subjects, 102 subjects had significant coefficients (at at least the 5% level) on their own offer variable, w_{it} or had a perfect or almost a perfect fit. 25 also had significant coefficients on the w_{jt} variable as well as w_{it} . None had a significant coefficient only on w_{jt} . In short, the primary determinant of rejection behavior seems to be one's own offer and not that of one's opponent. (We will discuss the coefficients on the kindness variable, k_{jt} , in a later section.)

These results present support for the threshold property of the Instrumental Reciprocity Hypothesis and for rejection of Myopic Altruism and other-regarding preferences since, under those hypotheses, a subject would have to take into effect his or her opponent's offer in determining the rejection and acceptance of an offer pair.

It is one thing to suggest that subjects behaved in a manner consistent with threshold strategies and yet another to suggest that they employed the theoretically optimal threshold of -27 in that strategy. Here our results suggest that while subjects did not use the theoretically optimal threshold in Random Matching treatments they did in the fixed matching treatments. More precisely, mean thresholds used by our subjects over all rounds in Random Matching treatments (Treatments 2, and 4) were -12.52 and -9.75 respectively which were significantly less than -27 using a t-test ($t=4.5457$, $p = 0.0001$; $t=5.5065$, $p=0.0000$). On the other hand, in the Fixed Matching treatments (Treatments 1 and 3), mean thresholds (-18.85 and -18.89, respectively) and for these thresholds we can not reject the hypothesis that they employed a threshold of -27 at 5% level ($t=1.8080$, $p=0.0810$; $t=1.6119$, $p=0.1171$).

In conclusion, we have presented strong support for the idea that subjects employ threshold strategies.

¹²If we restrict this Logit regression to only consider negative values for a subject's own offer, we get similar results.

¹³The regressions for these subjects are not, therefore, included in Table 5.

This result leads to rejection of the hypothesis that subjects were myopically altruistic or exhibiting other regarding preferences. However, we could not support the hypothesis that subjects employed the optimal thresholds across all treatments.

5.2 Hypothesis 2

The theory underlying these experiments relies on the use of trigger strategies with optimal thresholds. While we have offered support for the existence of threshold behavior, it is harder to detect whether our subjects used trigger strategies since punishments are only employed out of equilibrium. Given our data, however, it is hard to observe such out-of-equilibrium behavior. For example, one test as to whether triggers were employed would be to find a subject rejecting an offer that is better than what he/she had already accepted in an earlier period. This is true because if a threshold/trigger strategy is being employed, in the cooperative phase once an offer is accepted, all offers better than that one should be accepted as well. This would signal that the punishment phase had started. In our data, however, such occurrences are very rare (less than 1%) and, as a result, this test can not be used as evidence that triggers were employed.

Another feature of trigger strategies that should be observable in our data is the use of a common threshold for subjects who are paired together in the Fixed Matching Treatment. This is necessary since it must be commonly agreed upon as to when the punishment phase should be triggered. Hence, if optimal trigger strategies with the threshold property were used it would have to be the case that our paired subjects used the same threshold during the experiment or at least converged to the same common threshold as time progressed. (Remember, for our experiment the optimal trigger is unique).¹⁴ The establishment of a common threshold takes time, however, at least for those subjects who do not have the ability to solve for the optimal equilibrium strategy. Hence, one explanation for the behavior of our subjects is that while they quickly learned to use a threshold strategy they had to interact over time to establish a common threshold upon which to base their trigger. If this is in fact the case, we should see the difference between the thresholds used by paired subjects in the Fixed matching treatments converge to zero over rounds. This is in fact what we see in Tables 6a and 6b.

¹⁴In fact, if behavior was optimal this common threshold would need to be -27.

**Table 6a: Difference in Pair Thresholds:
Fixed-Matching Low-Information Treatment**

Format: Difference (Threshold1, Threshold 2)

Pair	All rounds	Rounds 1-5	Rounds 6-10
1-4	5 (-10,-5)	3 (-8,-5)	1 (-10,-9)
2-18	13 (-9, -22)	15 (-10, -25)	3 (-7, -10)
5-13	1 (-6,-7)	10 (-15,-5)	3 (-6,-9)
8-19	6 (-8, -14)	9 (-5,-14)	3 (-10,-13)
11-16	1 (0,-1)	11 (-12, -1)	0 (+2,+2)
21-27	1 (-1, 0)	9 (-1, +8)	0 (-1, -1)
23-26	4 (-4, 0)	13 (+9, -4)	2 (+2, +4)
24-28	4 (-8, -12)	10 (-7, -17)	2 (-11, -9)
25-29	22 (-19, +3)	23 (-19, +4)	1 (-2, -3)
Mean	6.3	11.4	1.7

**Table 6b: Difference in Pair Thresholds Fixed
Matching High Information Treatment**

Pair	All rounds	Rounds 1-5	Rounds 6-10
59-80	1 (-1 0)	9 (+8, -1)	4 (-4, 0)
65-71	22 (-23, -1)	23 (-24, -1)	12 (-14, -2)
67-73	4 (-3,+1)	6 (-3, +3)	1 (-3, -2)
72-79	7 (0, -7)	1 (0, -1)	9 (+2, -7)
83-88	5 (1, -4)	10 (-1, -11)	2 (+1, +3)
85-87	1 (-4,-3)	8 (-4, -12)	3 (+7, +4)
86-89	1 (+5, +4)	1 (+4, +3)	5 (-8, -2)
Mean	5.9	8.6	5.1

Tables 6a and 6b present the differences between the thresholds of paired subjects in our Fixed Matching Low and High Information Treatments and calculates this difference for the first and last five rounds of the experiment. As we can see, there is a general movement toward convergence in the thresholds used

which is most pronounced in the Fixed Matching Low Information treatment where, in rounds 6-10 the mean difference in the thresholds used was 1.7. This convergence lends support to the idea that our subjects were using trigger strategies but that it took time for our subjects to agree on a common threshold to serve as a trigger.

5.3 Hypothesis 3

If subjects subscribe to Kindness or Backward-looking reciprocity then the probability of accepting a negative offer in any period, t , should be positively related to the previous kindness of one's opponent up until period $t-1$. To test this hypothesis refer back to the regression reported in Table 5 where we regressed our binary acceptance decision a_{it} on a subject's offer in period t , w_{it} , his opponent's offer w_{jt} , and his opponent's kindness, k_{jt} up to and including period $t-1$.

As is obvious from this table, we can strongly reject the hypothesis that subjects consider the previous kindness of their opponents when deciding whether or not to reject an offer. There were only nine in which the kindness variable was significant at at least the 5% level.

The above results should not suggest that kindness reciprocity has no impact at all on behavior. We suspect that over time our subjects do respond indirectly to the kindness of their opponent by altering the threshold they use to accept and reject offers. To test this hypothesis we perform the following simple exercise. Using the data from our Fixed Matching No Information treatment, Treatment 1, we first divide the data into early (rounds 1-5) and late (rounds 6-10) rounds. We then correlate the change in thresholds used by our subjects from the first five to the last five rounds with the kindness of their opponents over the first five rounds. If our hypothesis is correct then we would expect a negative correlation between first-five-round kindness and the change in the thresholds used with more kindness observed in the first five rounds leading to lower (more negative) thresholds in the last five rounds. The correlation performed indicates that the relationship is negative, as it should be, with a correlation coefficient of -0.292 which is significant at the 5 % level. Hence, it would appear that kindness has an indirect impact of reciprocity - the kinder one's opponent is in the first five rounds the lower one's threshold is likely to be in the last five rounds. Such behavior may help to explain the convergence of thresholds noted on when discussing trigger strategies in Hypothesis 2.

5.4 Hypothesis 4

In our experimental design we run both fixed and random matching treatments with and without high information. In the High Information treatments we inform our subjects about the occurrence of the last round just before it is played. This allows a very natural test of whether subjects engage in backward (intrinsic) or forward looking (instrumental) reciprocity since, if subjects are backward looking, in the last round they should still be willing to reciprocate previous kindness with kind behavior by accepting a negative offer while, forward looking behavior would rule out such a kind act since in the last period of a round subjects know they have no future together and hence the motivation to reciprocate is gone. Hence if Instrumental reciprocity were the guide to behavior we should see less negative offers being accepted in the last period of those treatments where information was full than in either the period just before the last or over all periods before the last. We expect to observe this behavior in the Random Matching treatments but not necessarily the Fixed Matching treatments since, in the Fixed Matching treatments, where people are rematched round after round, "last periods" lose their importance because subjects may still be willing to accept a low negative offer in a last period of round t in order to build a reputation that will be "reborn" in the round $t+1$ when they are rematched together. It is for this reason that we did the Random-Matching treatment in the first place.

As we see in Table 7a, our expectations were supported. Looking down column 1, we see that the fraction of negative offers accepted in the last period of the Random Matching Treatment was 0.112 while it was 0.191 for the period just before the last and 0.194 for all periods before the last ($p < 0.05$ in both cases). Note that, as expected, the same is not true for the Fixed Matching Treatment where the last period acceptance rates were 0.248 in the high-information treatment and 0.218 in the low information treatment, and the difference is not significant. There are other comparisons which may be telling here as well. For example, we may want to compare the acceptance rates for subjects in the last periods of our two Random Matching treatments (Treatments 2 and 4) since both periods are last periods but in one that fact is known while in the other it is not. As we see, the acceptance rates are in fact lower with 0.112 of the offers being accepted when subjects know the offer was a last period offer while 0.159 were accepted when they did not know ($p < .05$).

**Table 7a: Negative Offer Acceptance,
Last and Not Last Rounds: All Treatments**

		Random	Fixed	Random	Fixed
		High info	High info	Low info	Low info
Last Period	Mean	0.112	0.241	0.159	0.239
	SD	0.317	0.430	0.367	0.428
	N	98	116	157	113
All Periods but Last	Mean	0.194	0.225	0.154	0.197
	SD	0.396	0.418	0.361	0.398
	N	949	1033	1319	1026
Next to Last Period	Mean	0.191	0.248	0.141	0.218
	SD	0.395	0.434	0.349	0.415
	N	110	121	156	110

In order to control dependency of the aggregate data due to observations from same subjects, we ran fixed effect logit regressions on the panel data where the left hand variable, "decision" was coded as a binary $\{0,1\}$ variable where 1 denoted acceptance and 0 rejection. This variable was regressed on one of a set of dummy variables to be described below. We generated two dummy variables: *information* which assigns 1 if an observation comes from a treatment with High Information (i.e. get information on whether the current period is the last period) and *lastperiod* which assigns 1 if an observation comes from the last period. By looking at the last period data only, in the Random Matching treatments (Treatments 2 and 4) we find that *information* has a significant effect on rejecting negative offers. This is not the case, however, if we look at the next to last period or all periods but the last one (see Table 7b). Additionally, in the random matching with high information treatment, *lastperiod* has a significant effect on rejecting negative offers (*coef.* = $-.078$, *SE* = $.038$, *N* = 1047, *p* < $.05$).

**Table 7b: Testing Negative Offer Acceptance,
Last and Not Last Rounds: Random Matching Treatments**

	Random Matching All but Last	Random Matching Last Period	Random Matching Next to Last Period
Information	-0.05	-1.00*	0
(SE)	(0.137)	(0.455)	(0.506)
Subject Fixed Effects	<i>YES</i>	<i>YES</i>	<i>YES</i>
N	2268	255	266
R ²	0.17	0.37	0.30

* : $p < .05$

One last comparison is interesting, and that is to compare the acceptance rates in the Random Matching High and Low information treatments for all periods before the last. In other words, in these periods while the subjects in the High Information treatment knew that that period's offer was not the last, subjects in the Low Information treatment had to form a subjective estimate of the probability that that offer would be the last, an estimate that presumably increased as time went on and was positive in each period past the sixth. Under these circumstances we would expect that the acceptance rate in the High Information treatment would be higher than in the Low Information treatment since presumably subjects knew that these were still reputation building periods while subjects in the Low Information treatment had a positive probability that this was the last period. Using data in the combined Low and High Random-Matching treatments for all periods but the last and regressing decision on *information* (again controlling subject fixed effects), supports the idea that acceptance rates are higher in the periods before the last when in the High-Information Treatment (*coef.* = .25, *SE* = .087, *N* = 2268, $p < .05$).

Our comments above lend support to the idea that most of the behavior we observed in this experiment, if it was reciprocal at all, was primary of the instrumental type. This is supported here by the fact that when subjects know they are in the last period of their interaction they tend to accept fewer negative offers while when they are not in the last period, but know that they will be informed when the last period comes, they accept more, presumably in an effort to keep their reputation alive.

5.5 Methodological contribution to infinitely repeated games experiments

In laboratory experiments, infinitely repeated games are induced by random termination. Using random termination may be costly, however, since some games may end quickly (even after only one period) and if they do they furnish little data for analysis. Because of this we introduce a novel method for our infinitely repeated game experiments that allows collecting more data from each subject. To do this subjects first play the repeated game for fixed number, k , of periods (six in our experiment) with a discount factor and then play with random termination from period $k+1$ onward. The probability of termination is derived from the discount factor so that theoretically the two parts of the game "blend" into each other seamlessly. If this blending was, in fact, seamless, we should not observe any discrete change in the rejection probabilities of negative offers in the last (sixth) period of the deterministic phase and the first (seventh) period of the stochastic termination period. If we did, that would be evidence of a behavioral shift as we entered the stochastic phase of the round. To test this we pooled all of our data and compared the proportion of subjects accepting negative offers over two adjacent periods: the last period played with a deterministic discount factor (period 6) and the first period with a random termination (period 7) (conditional on that period not being the last in any treatment with high information). What we find is that the fraction of negative offers rejected is practically identical across these two periods, 20% and 19.16% in the 6th and 7th periods, respectively, and these proportions are not significantly different ($z=0.2706$, $p=0.7867$). This result is what we hoped for since we wanted to smoothly bridge the transition between that portion of the game that was deterministic and that which was stochastic.

As a more formal approach to investigating whether acceptance behavior changes when we move across the boundary from periods 1-6 to periods 7 and beyond, we tested whether a structural break occurred in the estimated logit acceptance function between periods 1-6 and 7 and above, where the logit we were interested in had the $\{0,1\}$ binary acceptance variable as a dependent variable and a subject's own offer (my_w) as the dependent variable using only those offers that were negative. To do this we first pooled all of our observations from all treatments. We then defined a dummy variable that takes a value of 0 if the observation came from period 1-6 and a value of 1 if it came from periods greater than 6. This dummy variable is entered as an independent variable and interacted with the intercept and slope coefficient in our logit estimation using a random effects specification for the error terms. This yields the following model (Model 1): $acceptance = \alpha + \beta_1(my_w) + \beta_2D + \beta_3D(my_w) + v_i + \epsilon_{it}$, where α , β_1 , β_2 , and

β_3 are the coefficients to be estimated. We test the hypothesis that β_2 and β_3 independently are equal to zero as well as investigate whether they are jointly equal to zero. We do the latter by estimating the model with the restriction that $\beta_2 = \beta_3 = 0$ (Model 2) and performing a maximum likelihood ratio test.

The results of this estimation are presented below.

Table 8: Structural Break Regressions Results: Random Effects Logit				
	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z
my_w	.0648	.0034	19.01	0.000
Dummy	.2313	1696	1.36	0.173
Dummy·my_w	.0009	.0048	0.19	0.848
Constant	.0658	.1979	0.33	0.739
N = 4811, Log likelihood = -1483.48, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000, Log Likelihood Model 1 = -1483.48, Log Likelihood model 2 = -1485.46, chi2(2) =3.96, prob > 0.1373				

As we can see, the result are consistent with the hypothesis that moving from a deterministic to a stochastic discounting regime after period 6 did not have any statistically significant impact of acceptance or rejection behavior. The β_2 and β_3 coefficients are both insignificantly different from zero indicating that there is no structural break in the acceptance function at period 6. In addition, the likelihood ratio test also indicates that β_2 and β_3 are jointly insignificantly different from zero.

In short, this regression lends support to the idea that our method of insuring a finite number of periods of play in our infinitely repeated game did not alter the behavior of our subjects at the point where discounting became stochastic.

6 Conclusions

This paper has investigated the motives for reciprocal behavior in an infinitely repeated veto game. In such games, in each of an infinite number of periods, Nature generates a pair of payoffs, one for each player. Although the sum of the players' payoffs is positive, with positive probability one of the players receives a negative payoff. In each period each pair member is asked to approve or reject the payoff pair.

If both subjects accept, then they receive the payoffs proposed, if one or more reject they both get zero. Clearly reciprocity in this game entails being willing to accept negative payoffs today with the hope that such generosity will be reciprocated in the future.

We consider this game to be a good vehicle to study reciprocity because the rationale for reciprocal behavior is obvious and the game is simple, despite the fact that it is infinitely repeated. Following Cabral (2005) we designed an experiment whose purpose was to allow us to identify which one of two possible sources of reciprocity, intrinsic or instrumental, were most responsible for subject behavior.

Using some newly developed techniques to conduct infinitely repeated games, our data supports the notion that in this infinitely repeated game context, subject behavior is better described by theories of instrumental reciprocity but only to the extent that such reciprocity is part of a forward looking long run self-serving strategy. This is in distinction to intrinsic theories of reciprocity where reciprocal behavior is backward looking and exists to reward or punish previous kindness or unkindness. Despite this result, we find a number of ways that our subjects reciprocate kindness by sacrificing for opponents who have proven themselves to be kind in the past.

Finally, our results are consistent with the theory of veto games as presented in Cabral (2005) where optimal equilibrium behavior is characterized by a threshold for one's own payoff below which all offers are rejected but above which all offers are accepted regardless of the offer made to one's pair member.

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Tables 4a-4d: Thresholds

Table 4a: Thresholds - Treatment 1 Fixed matching Low Information

Subject	Max	Min	Mean	# of points	% of points
	Threshold	Threshold	Threshold	unexplained	unexplained
1	-9	-11	-10	1	1.0
2	-9	-9	-9	2	1.8
3	-83	-100	-91.5	6	5.8
4	-1	-8	-4.5	3	3.0
5	-6	-6	-6	2	2.3
6	-15	-29	-22	37	38.1
7	-27	-27	-27	6	5.8
8	-8	-8	-8	4	4.7
9	11	-21	-5	15	19.2
10	-42	-43	-42.5	7	5.3
11	2	-2	0	2	1.5
12	-35	-42	-38.5	3	3.1
13	-4	-10	-7	2	2.3
14	-19	-23	-21	4	4.1
15	-4	-4	-4	5	6.4
16	0	-1	-0.5	5	3.7
17	-43	-45	-44	13	9.9
18	-18	-26	-22	5	4.6
19	-13	-15	-14	0	0.0
20	-31	-38	-34.5	6	6.2
21	0	-1	-0.5	2	1.6
22	-97	-100	-98.5	16	19.5
23	4	3	3.5	2	2.2
24	-4	-12	-8	1	0.9
25	-17	-20	-18.5	3	3.1
26	2	-2	0	2	2.2
27	1	-1	0	0	0.0
28	-7	-17	-12	1	0.9
29	5	1	3	2	2.1
30	-18	-29	-23.5	6	7.3
Mean	-16.17	-21.53	-18.85	5.43	5.62
Median	-8.5	-13.5	-9.5	3.0	3.1

Table 4b: Thresholds - Treatment 2 Random matching High Information

Subject	Max	Min	Mean	# of points	% of points
	Threshold	Threshold	Threshold	unexplained	unexplained
31	-16	-16	-16	10	8.7
32	-19	-41	-30	4	5.1
33	-30	-40	-35	6	6.6
34	2	-6	-2	10	9.3
35	-6	-26	-16	3	3.6
36	-14	-15	-14.5	4	3.6
37	-1	-3	-2	13	14.1
38	2	0	1	1	0.9
39	-70	-76	-73	18	15.5
40	0	-1	-0.5	1	0.9
41	-16	-21	-18.5	5	5.4
42	2	1	1.5	0	0.0
43	1	1	1	4	3.8
44	2	0	1	0	0.0
45	-7	-8	-7.5	2	2.1
46	2	-2	0	4	3.9
47	-14	-22	-18	14	12.1
48	3	1	2	2	2.0
49	-2	-2	-2	2	1.7
50	-7	-8	-7.5	9	8.7
51	-12	-14	-13	10	9.6
52	-7	-7	-7	4	4.3
53	-8	-40	-24	7	7.9
54	-33	-51	-42	11	10.8
55	-10	-10	-10	6	6.7
56	-3	-31	-17	15	17.0
57	9	6	7.5	1	1.1
58	-8	-10	-9	1	1.2
Mean	-9.29	-15.75	-12.52	5.96	5.95
Median	-7.00	-9.00	-8.25	4.00	4.69

Table 4c: Thresholds - Treatment 3 Fixed matching High Information

Subject	Max	Min	Mean	# of points	% of points
	Threshold	Threshold	Threshold	unexplained	unexplained
59	6	-4	1	6	5.5
60	-37	-58	-47.5	8	9.3
61	-6	-34	-20	20	19.6
62	-6	-19	-12.5	21	23.1
63	-31	-31	-31	8	9.3
64	-4	-10	-7	3	3.3
65	-19	-26	-22.5	1	1.0
66	-95	-96	-95.5	3	3.2
67	0	-5	-2.5	0	0.0
68	-10	-17	-13.5	2	2.0
69	-5	-13	-9	9	11.7
70	2	-1	0.5	3	2.8
71	3	-5	-1	2	2.0
72	0	0	0	1	1.1
73	4	-2	1	0	0.0
74	-10	-14	-12	4	4.1
75	-99	-100	-99.5	2	2.1
76	-2	-19	-10.5	4	3.9
77	-54	-57	-55.5	12	11.3
78	-18	-18	-18	6	7.8
79	-7	-7	-7	2	2.2
80	0	0	0	7	6.4
81	-13	-13	-13	21	20.2
82	-38	-53	-45.5	6	5.0
83	4	-2	1	2	1.9
84	-83	-83	-83	4	3.3
85	-2	-5	-3.5	0	0.0
86	5	5	5	2	2.2
87	0	-5	-2.5	6	7.1
88	-3	-4	-3.5	3	2.9
89	-1	-1	-1	1	1.0
90	6	1	3.5	6	6.6
Mean	-16.03	-21.75	-18.89	5.47	5.68
Median	-4.50	-11.50	-8.00	3.50	3.32

Table 4d: Thresholds - Treatment 4 Random matching Low Information

Subject	Max Threshold	Min Threshold	Mean Threshold	# of points unexplaine	% of points unexplained
91	-6	-17	-11.5	6	7.4
92	3	-4	-0.5	4	4.1
93	-13	-22	-17.5	2	2.4
94	-19	-35	-27	3	3.1
95	0	-1	-0.5	1	1.1
96	5	-1	2	1	1.4
97	4	-1	1.5	1	1.2
98	5	4	4.5	3	2.8
99	100	100	100	25	26.9
100	-18	-35	-26.5	1	1.1
101	-1	-4	-2.5	6	5.5
102	1	-2	-0.5	0	0.0
103	-19	-25	-22	2	2.1
104	5	-10	-2.5	3	3.4
105	-11	-12	-11.5	4	3.8
106	-10	-15	-12.5	5	4.0
107	-16	-25	-20.5	5	5.3
108	-3	-5	-4	2	1.9
109	-10	-12	-11	2	2.8
110	-1	-4	-2.5	2	1.9
111	-8	-9	-8.5	0	0.0
112	12	6	9	0	0.0
113	-4	-7	-5.5	1	1.3
114	3	-2	0.5	20	19.8
115	-3	-4	-3.5	2	2.8
116	1	-1	0	0	0.0
117	0	0	0	0	0.0
118	-17	-22	-19.5	4	4.7
119	-15	-15	-15	4	4.3
120	-5	-6	-5.5	0	0.0
121	-19	-28	-23.5	5	6.2
122	9	-4	2.5	1	1.1
123	-11	-19	-15	24	24.5
124	100	100	100	40	45.5
125	-15	-15	-15	4	3.1
126	-40	-42	-41	15	17.9
127	13	1	7	1	1.2
128	-38	-42	-40	6	6.3
129	-4	-22	-13	11	12.0
130	2	-4	-1	1	1.3
131	-6	-10	-8	2	2.2
132	-19	-41	-30	12	10.3
Mean	-1.62	-7.43	-4.52	5.50	5.87
Median	-4.00	-8.00	-5.50	2.50	2.80

Table 5: Logit Acceptance Functions

Subject	Lambda	coefficient				N	LL
		α	β_1 (own wage)	β_2 (other's wage)	β_3 (kindness)		
2	0	-0.513 (0.71)	0.077*** (0.021)	0.014 (0.017)	-3.579 (2.689)	109	-21.72
3	1	-0.201 (0.721)	0.097** (0.043)	0.086** (0.024)	-2.042 (1.736)	104	-15.16
4	0.8	0.36 (1.834)	0.196*** (0.068)	0.033 (0.029)	1.326 (2.295)	101	-8.26
6	0	-1.584*** (0.61)	0.065*** (0.016)	0.081*** (0.016)	1.612 (1.563)	97	-37.42
7	0.5	0.477 (1.173)	0.161*** (0.047)	0.069** (0.031)	12.571 (7.647)	104	-13.46
8	0	0.205 (0.696)	0.161*** (0.047)	0.017 (0.014)	2.755 (2.142)	85	-20.07
9	1	-1.657** (0.702)	0.051*** (0.016)	0.024** (0.012)	-0.506 (0.508)	78	-39.70
10	0.6	3.186*** (1.223)	0.048** (0.019)	-0.01 (0.021)	-2.2 (1.513)	131	-16.95
11	0.9	1.878 (2.991)	0.229** (0.098)	-0.021 (0.03)	-0.443 (1.263)	135	-5.07
12	0	5.93** (3.006)	0.123** (0.5)	-0.026 (0.036)	-5.513 (5.748)	97	-9.18
14	0.3	-0.378 (0.887)	0.124*** (0.034)	0.04* (0.023)	4.929 (5.834)	97	-17.94
15	1	-1.447* (0.756)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.025* (0.013)	0.606 (0.891)	78	-21.77
16	1	-1.647** (0.798)	0.078*** (0.016)	0.018 (0.013)	-1.048 (0.672)	135	-31.12
17	1	2.325* (1.19)	0.12*** (0.031)	0.053* (0.028)	2.228** (1.076)	131	-24.62

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Subject	Lambda	α	β_1 (own wage)	β_2 (other's wage)	β_3 (kindness)	N	LL
20	0.9	11.332*** (4.25)	0.08** (0.32)	-0.102** (0.051)	2.019 (1.719)	97	-11.71
21	0	-0.019 (0.671)	0.084*** (0.02)	0.013 (0.015)	2.56 (1.716)	126	-24.83
22	0.7	0.518 (0.484)	0.026** (0.013)	0.027** (0.012)	-0.808 (1.094)	82	-37.21
23	0.5	2.757 (2.875)	0.261** (0.112)	-0.052 (0.046)	3.814 (5.965)	91	-5.09
25	1	0.309 (2.067)	0.147*** (0.053)	0.029 (0.037)	-0.84 (0.704)	97	-9.13
26	1	-1.198 (1.358)	0.118*** (0.04)	0.025 (0.025)	0.905 (1.329)	91	-13.54
30	0.9	0.286 (0.957)	0.102*** (0.03)	0.032 (0.021)	2.054 (1.399)	82	-13.74
31	1	-0.854 (0.551)	0.069*** (0.17)	0.037*** (0.013)	-0.289 (0.344)	115	-38.60
32	0.1	-0.335 (1.042)	0.074*** (0.026)	0.025 (0.022)	-7.362 (4.703)	78	-13.09
33	1	3.063** (1.419)	0.082*** (0.028)	-0.002 (0.023)	0.744 (0.941)	91	-15.14
34	1	-1.828** (0.646)	0.07*** (0.017)	0.033*** (0.012)	-0.493* (0.297)	107	-40.19
35	1	4.211 (2.762)	0.171** (0.078)	0.013 (0.031)	5.943 (3.405)	84	-6.01
36	0.4	4.877** (2.846)	0.2*** (0.075)	0.001 (0.025)	5.686* (3.092)	111	-10.12
37	0.6	-0.845 (0.526)	0.053*** (0.015)	0.03* (0.012)	0.989 (0.904)	92	-45.44

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Subject	Lambda	α	β_1 (own wage)	β_2 (other's wage)	β_3 (kindness)	N	LL
39	0.7	5.059*** (1.299)	0.031** (0.015)	-0.033** (0.016)	6.447*** (1.73)	116	-21.37
41	1	3.912 (4.272)	0.391** (0.179)	0.075 (0.064)	4.965 (3.301)	93	-6.20
43	0	2.864** (1.446)	0.079*** (0.022)	-0.016 (0.021)	4.098 (2.802)	104	-13.31
45	0	1.362 (1.486)	0.37** (0.155)	0.044 (0.032)	-5.479 (3.633)	94	-7.43
46	0.4	0.406 (0.879)	0.086*** (0.029)	0.000 (0.015)	3.199* (1.681)	103	-17.51
47	1	2.234*** (0.837)	0.052*** (0.014)	0.000 (0.015)	2.643*** (0.845)	116	-30.30
48	1	-3.058* (1.746)	0.212*** (0.079)	0.031 (0.024)	-3.326* (1.958)	101	-9.9
49	0	3.489** (1.711)	0.181*** (0.057)	-0.047* (0.026)	11.54** (5.22)	121	-12.26
50	1	2.365** (1.032)	0.091*** (0.026)	-0.02 (0.017)	2.264* (1.247)	104	-19.21
51	0.2	-0.014 (0.503)	0.064*** (0.018)	0.041** (0.016)	1.717 (1.903)	104	-34.7
52	1	0.717 (0.991)	0.137*** (0.047)	0.045* (0.025)	1.657** (0.779)	94	-11.66
53	1	1.431 (1.079)	0.101*** (0.025)	0.036* (0.02)	1.275** (0.649)	89	-15.79
54	0.6	2.044*** (0.778)	0.061*** (0.019)	0.007 (0.016)	4.481** (1.764)	102	-25.89
55	1	2.085* (1.262)	0.078*** (0.025)	-0.012 (0.018)	1.225* (0.63)	89	-15.10

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Subject	Lambda	α	β_1 (own wage)	β_2 (other's wage)	β_3 (kindness)	N	LL
56	0.5	-1.544*** (0.513)	0.064*** (0.014)	0.052*** (0.013)	-2.495 (1.988)	88	-38.58
59	0	-0.713 (0.607)	0.062*** (0.016)	0.013 (0.013)	-1.154 (1.337)	110	-33.08
60	0.9	-0.458 (0.665)	0.08*** (0.028)	0.071** (0.028)	-1.285 (1.35)	86	-23.32
61	0	-1.56*** (0.589)	0.067*** (0.016)	0.054*** (0.013)	-2.48* (1.369)	102	-43.82
62	0	-0.852* (0.495)	0.047*** (0.012)	0.033*** (0.1)	1.39 (1.299)	91	-49.04
63	1	-1.331* (0.749)	0.123*** (0.031)	0.077*** (0.025)	-2.84 (1.951)	86	-20.75
64	0	3.145 (3.629)	7.514 (7.83)	1.416 (1.494)	37.454 (34.025)	91	-2.91
66	0.4	-6.797 (6.138)	1.424 (1.165)	1.335 (1.107)	17.902 (17.513)	95	-2.95
69	0.5	2.031 (1.249)	0.035 (0.025)	-0.054** (0.027)	8.436** (3.975)	77	-13.98
70	0.1	-0.466 (1.066)	0.172*** (0.55)	0.017 (0.021)	-2.017 (2.207)	106	-13.29
74	0.8	3.829* (1.97)	0.088*** (0.026)	-0.04 (0.028)	-3.349 (2.758)	98	-14.14
75	1	20.813 (15.842)	0.032 (0.039)	-0.18 (0.17)	5.988 (4.378)	95	-4.97
76	1	0.559 (1.646)	0.255*** (0.09)	0.017 (0.027)	-4.598 (3.084)	102	-7.00
77	0.4	0.812 (0.886)	0.071*** (0.02)	0.024 (0.021)	-3.242 (2.015)	106	-26.85

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Subject	Lambda	α	β_1 (own wage)	β_2 (other's wage)	β_3 (kindness)	N	LL
78	0	0.989 (1.011)	0.083*** (0.024)	0.006 (0.016)	1.312 (2.143)	77	-15.82
79	0.4	0.818 (0.846)	0.084*** (0.023)	0.001 (0.017)	1.655 (2.482)	89	-17.81
80	0.2	-0.456 (0.742)	0.078*** (0.019)	0.015 (0.014)	-2.139 (1.892)	110	-28.10
81	0	-1.652*** (0.561)	0.075*** (0.016)	0.055*** (0.013)	1.778 (1.224)	104	-46.17
82	0.9	2.245 (1.543)	0.176*** (0.063)	0.041 (0.033)	3.869** (1.847)	120	-9.30
83	0.9	-0.701 (1.043)	0.117*** (0.034)	-0.012 (0.016)	-1.319 (1.027)	105	-15.84
84	0.8	15.155* (7.935)	0.119*** (0.045)	-0.069 (0.09)	-1.054 (2.233)	120	-12.21
86	0.8	1.531 (1.419)	0.094*** (0.036)	-0.043* (0.024)	-1.451 (1.707)	91	-9.16
87	0	0.133 (0.708)	0.059*** (0.016)	0.015 (0.015)	-0.472 (1.652)	84	-27.66
88	1	0.882 (1.193)	0.182*** (0.059)	-0.01 (0.022)	1.876 (1.523)	105	-9.51
90	0.7	1.904** (0.925)	0.045*** (0.014)	-0.024 (0.015)	1.939 (1.272)	91	-25.92
91	1	1.14 (0.916)	0.071*** (0.021)	0.021 (0.019)	1.526 (1.103)	81	-17.42
92	0	-0.258 (0.945)	0.11*** (0.036)	0.024 (0.023)	2.164 (2.246)	98	-15.34
94	0.9	1.438 (1.925)	0.761 (0.537)	0.289 (0.223)	-0.811 (1.336)	98	-4.13

Subject	Lambda	α	β_1 (own wage)	β_2 (other's wage)	β_3 (kindness)	N	LL
98	0.8	-1.15 (1.13)	0.137*** (0.04)	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.868 (1;816)	108	-17.83
99	0	-3.848*** (0.76)	0.069*** (0.015)	0.067*** (0.014)	0.688 (1.86)	93	-33.63
101	1	-1.032 (0.873)	0.093*** (0.022)	0.03* (0.016)	0.552 (0.569)	110	-23.31
103	0.1	2.985 (2.253)	0.256** (0.114)	0.016 (0.046)	-6.058 (8.121)	95	-4.54
104	1	-1.248 (1.537)	0.153*** (0.05)	0.008 (0.023)	-2.521 (1.82)	87	-8.74
105	0.2	-0.435 (0.673)	0.084*** (0.02)	0.023 (0.015)	-3.465 (2.417)	105	-23.80
106	1	-1.093 (0.832)	0.11*** (0.025)	0.04** (0.016)	-0.4 (0.5)	125	-25.21
107	0.3	0.888 (0.96)	0.076*** (0.019)	0.017 (0.02)	1.057 (2.17)	95	-20.74
108	1	0.312 (2.028)	0.234** (0.11)	0.012 (0.032)	-0.427 (1.409)	106	-6.16
110	1	0.496 (1.034)	0.115*** (0.038)	0.000 (0.021)	-1.323 (1.601)	103	-12.57
114	1	-0.318 (0.46)	0.049*** (0.013)	0.029*** (0.01)	0.893*** (0.305)	101	-51.01
115	0.5	2.038 (1.623)	0.12** (0.048)	-0.005 (0.024)	2.477 (3.101)	72	-8.74
118	0.9	-0.279 (1.299)	0.11*** (0.037)	0.032 (0.024)	-8.819 (5.388)	85	-11.65
119	0.7	0.598 (0.906)	0.1*** (0.031)	0.036 (0.022)	3.128* (1.676)	93	-16.44

Subject	Lambda	α	β_1 (own wage)	β_2 (other's wage)	β_3 (kindness)	N	LL
121	0.9	4.412** (2.111)	0.109*** (0.038)	-0.015 (0.026)	2.355 (2.105)	81	-9.74
123	0.6	-2.214*** (0.545)	0.074*** (0.015)	0.058*** (0.012)	2.033 (1.249)	98	-43.07
124	0.4	-0.064 (0.436)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.478 (1.053)	88	-60.21
125	0	3.199** (1.392)	0.133*** (0.037)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.726 (2.704)	130	-16.16
126	1	-0.514 (0.443)	0.049*** (0.012)	0.034*** (0.011)	1.095** (0.527)	84	-38.50
128	1	2.479* (1.283)	0.096*** (0.03)	0.022 (0.025)	1.152 (0.981)	95	-13.43
129	0	-0.424 (0.528)	0.051*** (0.014)	0.02 (0.013)	1.624 (1.947)	92	-34.46
131	0.2	2.841 (1.993)	0.094*** (0.031)	-0.024 (0.028)	7.368 (4.785)	90	-12.87
132	0.8	0.661 (0.627)	0.057*** (0.012)	0.019 (0.012)	0.767 (1.652)	116	-38.59
					Treatment 1	Subjects 1-30	
					Treatment 2	Subjects 31 - 58	
					Treatment 3	Subjects 59 -90	
					Treatment 4	Subjects 91 - 132	
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%							

7 Appendix

Proof of Proposition (Equilibrium (Instrumental) Reciprocity): We first prove that any optimal equilibrium must have the property that $x_i^C(w_i, w_j) = 1$ if and only if $w_i \geq -\ell_i$. Next we show that there is a unique optimal equilibrium with this property. Finally, in the section below, which demonstrates how to derive the optimal ℓ , we demonstrate how ℓ varies with the Nash threat assumed in the punishment phase.

Consider two points in the second quadrant (that is, where $w_1 > 0$ and $w_2 < 0$): $A = (w_1^A, w_2^A)$ and $B = (w_1^B, w_2^B)$. Suppose that $w_2^A > w_2^B$, $x_2(w_1^A, w_2^A) = 0$ and $x_2(w_1^B, w_2^B) = 1$. In other words, player 2 approves proposal B but vetoes proposal A , even though proposal A gives player 2 a higher payoff. If this were an equilibrium, then player 2's no-deviation constraint must be met at point B . But then it must also be met at point A . It follows that, by choosing $x_2(w_1^A, w_2^A) = 1$ instead, we get an alternative equilibrium with a higher sum of joint payoffs—a contradiction.

The above argument implies that players' strategies must take the form $x_i^C(w_i, w_j) = 1$ if and only if $w_i \geq -\ell_i$. It also implies that the no-deviation constraint, $w_i + \frac{\delta}{1-\delta} E_i \geq \frac{\delta}{1-\delta} N_i$, is exactly binding when $w_i = -\ell_i$:

$$-\ell_i + \frac{\delta}{1-\delta} E_i = \frac{\delta}{1-\delta} N_i, \quad (1)$$

Finally, it also implies that equilibrium payoff for player i is given by

$$E_i \equiv \int_{\substack{w_i \geq -\ell_i \\ w_j \geq -\ell_j}} w_i f(w) dw - \int_{\substack{w_i \geq 0 \\ w_j \geq 0}} w_i f(w) dw.$$

Notice that E_i is increasing in ℓ_j and decreasing in ℓ_i .

We now show that there exists a unique efficient equilibrium, that is, one that maximizes joint payoffs. Suppose there were two such equilibria, corresponding to threshold levels (ℓ'_i, ℓ'_j) and (ℓ''_i, ℓ''_j) and leading to equilibrium payoffs (E'_i, E'_j) and (E''_i, E''_j) , respectively. Without loss of generality, assume $E''_i \geq E'_i$ and $E'_j \geq E''_j$.

Equation (1) and $E''_i \geq E'_i$ imply $\ell'_i \leq \ell''_i$. By a similar argument, $\ell'_j \geq \ell''_j$. Since E_i is increasing in ℓ_j and decreasing in ℓ_i , this implies that $E''_i \leq E'_i$. Given our starting assumption that $E''_i \geq E'_i$, we conclude that $E''_i = E'_i$, and so $\ell'_i = \ell''_i$. By a similar argument, we also conclude that $E''_j = E'_j$ and $\ell'_j = \ell''_j$. ■

◇ Derivation of equilibrium ℓ : First we compute the value of π^N , equilibrium payoff in the static Nash

game. Recall that there are two types of Nash equilibrium. In the weakly dominant strategy one (a player accepts a proposal if and only if his payoff is positive):

The area of the region where $w_i \geq 0$, for both i , is given by

$$\int_0^{100} x(100 - x) dx = \frac{500,000}{3}. \quad (2)$$

Straightforward calculations show that the total area of the set of proposals is given by 15,000. Since the distribution of w is uniform over this set, it follows that π^N is given by (2) divided by 15,000, or simply

$$\pi^N = \frac{100}{9}.$$

In the class of Nash equilibria in which any offer is rejected, the payoff of each player is equal to 0.

The next step is to compute the value of π^E , payoff along the repeated game efficient equilibrium path.

The area of the shaded region in Figure 4 is given by

$$\int_{-\ell}^0 x(100 - (-x)) dx + \int_0^{\ell} x(100 - x - (-x)) dx + \int_{\ell}^{100} x(100 - x - (-\ell)) dx,$$

or simply

$$\frac{2}{3}\ell^3 - \frac{1,000,000}{3} + \frac{1}{2}(100 + \ell)(10,000 - \ell^2). \quad (3)$$

It follows that π^E is given by (3) divided by 15,000, or simply

$$\pi^E = \frac{\ell^3}{22500} - \frac{200}{9} + \frac{(100 + \ell)(10000 - \ell^2)}{30000}.$$

Given the values of π^E and π^N , we can now derive the equilibrium value of ℓ by making the no-deviation inequality binding. We thus have

$$\ell + \delta \pi^E / (1 - \delta) = 0 + \delta \pi^N / (1 - \delta).$$

If the players use their weakly dominant strategy as a threat, first note that zero is a root. In fact, if $\ell = 0$, then $\pi^E = \pi^N$ and the no-deviation constraint holds trivially. Hence, we are left with a quadratic equation with the roots: $150 \pm 50\sqrt{36/\delta - 39}$, and it can easily be shown that only one of the roots (potentially) lies in the relevant interval, $[-100, 0]$. We thus have

$$\ell = 150 - 50\sqrt{36/\delta - 39}.$$

Solving for $\ell < 0$, we get $\delta > \frac{3}{4}$. Solving for $\ell > -100$, we get $\delta < .9$. So finally we have

$$\hat{\ell} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \delta < .75 \\ -150 + 50 \sqrt{36/\delta - 39} & \text{if } .75 \leq \delta \leq .9 \\ -100 & \text{if } \delta > .9 \end{cases}$$

In particular, $\delta = .8$ (parameter in the experiment) implies $\hat{\ell} = -27.53$.

If any offer is rejected as a punishment strategy, then $\ell + \delta \pi^E / (1 - \delta) = 0$ and again only one root lies in $[-100, 0]$. When $\delta = .8$ implies $\hat{\ell} = 88.83$. Hence, any $\hat{\ell}$ between 27.53 and 88.83 can be sustained in the equilibrium. Since the sum of the offers are always positive, the efficient equilibrium is achieved when $\hat{\ell} = 88.83$.

Proof of Proposition (Equilibrium with Altruistic Preferences): Let $\Phi_i(w_{it}, w_{jt})$ be the altruistic utility function of the player i such that $\frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial w_{it}} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial w_{jt}} > 0$ for all $i, j = 1, 2$. Suppose on the contrary that the optimal trigger-strategy equilibrium exists in threshold strategies, in other words there exists ℓ_i such that $x_i(w_i, w_j) = 1$ if and only if $w_i \geq -\ell_i$ for some $\ell_i < 100$. In particular, the proposal $(-l_i, l_i)$ is accepted but player i vetoes the proposal $(-l_i - \varepsilon, 100)$ for any $\varepsilon > 0$. Since $\frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial w_{jt}} > 0$, $\Phi_i(w_{it}, w_{jt})$ is continuous and $\ell_i < 100$, there exists an ε as small as possible such that $\Phi_i(-l_i - \varepsilon, 100) > \Phi_i(-l_i, l_i)$. Hence, we get an alternative equilibrium in which both players would approve $(-l_i - \varepsilon, 100)$ and in this an alternative equilibrium with a higher sum of joint payoffs - a contradiction. ■

Instructions: Random Matching High Information

This is an experiment in decision making. Money has been provided for this experiment by various research foundations. You will be paid for your participation and if you make good decisions you may be able to earn a substantial amount of money that will be paid to you when the experiment is over.

The Experiment.

You have been recruited to participate in this experiment along with a number of other people who are in the room with you. When the experiment starts you will be paired with one person in the room at random. This person will be your pair member for the rest of the experiment. The experiment will consist of 10 rounds with each round consisting of a random number of periods. While the number of periods will be random, there will always be at least 6 in any round. After period 6 is over in any given round, whether you proceed to the next period will be determined randomly as will be described below. So in any round you will play 6 periods for sure and maybe more.

When Round 1 starts you and your pair member will be shown a computer screen upon which two numbers will be shown, one indicating a potential payment to you and one a potential payment to your pair member. These payments are denominated in a fictitious experimental currency called francs which will be converted at the end of the experiment at a rate of 1 franc = 0.6 cents. The numbers will be drawn at random but all the pairs of numbers you will see will have the same two properties:

1) Each payment to each pair member will be independently chosen from the interval [-100, +100].

In other words, you will never see a number outside this range, and within this range each number will have an equally likely chance of being chosen, so there will be an equal chance that your number is -20 as it will be +85 as it will be -99, or +42 etc.

2) The sum of the numbers must be positive and less than 100.

This means that when the computer draws a number for you and your pair member and adds them up, if the sum is negative or greater than 100 the computer will throw that pair of numbers away and pick another. You will only see pairs whose sum is positive and less than 100.

When the payment pairs are drawn you will see a screen that says:

Your franc payment _____

Your pair member's franc payment _____

And you will be asked to approve or refuse the payments. If you approve you must click the approve button at the bottom of the screen; if you refuse, click the refuse button.

If both subjects approve the payment pair, you will both receive that amount indicated as a payment for the period. If either of you refuse, you both will receive nothing during that period.

When period 1 is over, you will be shown the results of that period by being informed of what your pair member chose (accept or refuse) and your payoff. We then proceed directly to period 2, which will be identical to period 1, that is, you will be shown a new randomly drawn payment pair and asked to accept or refuse. When period 2 is over you will be shown the results of that period and also your cumulative payoff up until that period and then proceed to period 3. This will happen for 6 periods. After the 6th period, the computer will randomly determine whether you move to period 7. It does this by flipping a coin that has a .80 chance of landing heads and a .20 chance of landing tails. If the coin lands heads, we proceed to period 7 and repeat the procedures above; and at the end the computer randomly determines whether we move to period 8. This will continue until the computer determines that you will not proceed to any more periods. When that is determined the computer will notify you that you will now be playing the last period in this round by announcing that **“This is the Last Period in this Round”**. After you finish that period the current round of the experiment will end. In other words, you will be told when you are playing the last period in any round. When the round is over, you will be shown your payoffs for that round, proceed to the Round 2 and repeat the experiment identically. There will be 10 rounds in the experiment, but as you have seen, each round may have a different number of periods, depending on chance.

As stated above, all of the above payments will be denominated in a fictitious experimental currency called francs. At the end of the experiment, your payment will be converted into US dollars at the rate of 1 franc = 0.6 cents.

There is only one detail left to be explained: Within the first 6 periods of any round of the experiment, the periods we know we will play for sure, the number of francs you will receive when you accept a proposed payment pair will vary. More precisely we will multiply your displayed franc payoff by a “multiplier” depending upon the period the payoff is accepted (your pair member’s franc payoff will also be multiplied by this number as well). The set of multipliers used is shown in Table 1 below:

Period Multipliers

Period	Multiplier
1	3.05
2	2.44
3	1.95
4	1.56
5	1.25
6	1.00
7+	1.00

To illustrate what this table says, say that in period 1 of any round you and your pair member agree to a payoff pair that gives you a franc payoff of 20. In such a case instead of you being credited with 20 francs as your payment you would be credited with $20 \times 3.05 = 61$, where 3.05 is the multiplier associated with period 1 in the table above. If you agreed to the same payoff in period 5 you would be credited with $20 \times 1.25 = 25$, where 1.25 is the period-5 multiplier. Note that the multipliers decrease as we approach period 6, the last period you will engage in for sure, where the multiplier is equal to 1. It will remain equal to 1 for all succeeding periods; but, as we have explained above, in all succeeding periods the probability of continuing is equal to .8.

Final Payoffs:

Your final payoff in the experiment will be the sum of your earning over the 10 rounds of the experiments. That means that we will sum your franc payoffs earned in each round of the experiment and then convert them into U.S. dollars at the rate of 1 franc = 0.6 cents.